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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Introduction
Auctions have long been used as a means for price determination under a com-
petitive setting and an environment where the information is incomplete. Various goods
such as U.S. treasury bills, lands in China, pieces of art, mineral rights, timber rights are
traded through di¤erent types of auctions all over the world. In addition to their practical
importance, auctions have drawn much attention of economists for two reasons. First, auc-
tions provide a perfect example to the game with incomplete information (Harsanyi (1967,
1968)) in that auctions have clearly stated rules and obvious features of incomplete infor-
mation between the auctioneer and bidders, as well as among bidders. Therefore auctions
have been used to verify the testable implications derived from theory. Second, plenty of
eld auction data are available, such as highway procurement auctions data and timber
auctions data, which is one of the main driving forces that causes the rapid development of
the empirical auction studies. Therefore since the seminal paper by Vickery(1961), auction
theory developed within the game-theoretic framework has grown at a rapid rate, which not
only helps us understand how auctions work, but also o¤ers insight in analyzing many other
economic problems. Among many studies, two polar cases, independent private value (IPV)
and common value (CV) frameworks are intensively adopted in the literature. Within the
IPV framework, the valuations of the object are private information of bidders, drawn from
distributions independently, while within the CV framework, the object has the same ex
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post valuation to all bidders. Many celebrated theoretical results have been derived within
these two paradigms. For example, within the symmetric IPV framework with risk-neutral
bidders, all auction formats (rst-price auction, second-price auction, English auction and
Dutch auction) generate the same amount of expected revenue to the seller, which is called
Revenue Equivalence Proposition (REP) derived by Vickery (1961). Within the CV frame-
work, it is found that the number of bidders is not positively related with bids due to the
winners curse. Though quite a few applications have been made within these two para-
digms, the main drawback of these two paradigms is being apart from the reality. In reality,
biddersvalues over the object might be neither independent from each other nor the same.
Instead they might be dependent from each other. A good example of the source of such
dependence is that values are a¤ected by some unknown common factors.
In light of this, researchers have started to focus on a¢ liation, which is a more
general concept in that it includes independent private value and common value frameworks
as special cases. A¢ liation is a concept borrowed from the multivariate statistics literature,
in which it is called multivariate total positivity of order 2, and was rst introduced into the
auction literature by Milgrom and Weber (1982). Throughout the dissertation, the term
a¢ liation follows the same denition as is given in Milgrom and Weber (1982) and will be
stated in detail later. In addition to the fact that a¢ liation is a more general concept, several
reasons make it important to the auction study. First, a¢ liation guarantees the existence
and uniqueness of a monotone equilibrium in many scenarios (e.g. see Rodriguez (2000)
for a two-person rst-price auction with symmetric or asymmetric bidders). Second, under
this general assumption, REP can be extended to a more general result derived in Milgrom
and Weber (1982) that English auction has a higher expected revenue than the second-
price auction, which in turn has a higher expected revenue than the rst-price auction.
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Third, several results within the IPV framework no longer hold. The e¤ect of the number
of potential bidders on bids is not always positive with a¢ liation among bidders due to
the a¢ liation e¤ect(Pinkse and Tan (2005)). The optimal reserve price converges to the
true value of the seller as the number of bidders increases within the a¢ liated private value
(APV) framework as is shown in Levin and Smith (1994). Therefore from both theoretical
and empirical viewpoints, it is interesting and important to incorporate a¢ liation in the
auction study.
Another important feature of the dissertation is taking bidders entry decisions
into account. Not only found in the auction literature, entry is also an important topic in
other elds of industrial organization, especially in the studies of oligopoly markets. See,
for example, Berry (1992) for a model of entry in the airline industry, and Seim (2006) for
an entry model with endogenous product-type choices. In the auction framework, entry
refers to the participations of bidders, which should be viewed as one part of decisions
bidders make in an auction due to some nontrivial participation costs. That is, bidders
make their entry decisions by comparing the expected prots and costs from participation.
Ignoring the entry will cause the model to be misspecied and the estimation of the model
to be biased. For example, one might overestimate the e¤ect of the number of bidders on
bids since there is a negative entry e¤ect due to entry (Li and Zheng (2005)). To this
end, a central theme in this dissertation is to take bidders participation into account. In
the theoretical framework, there are two prevailing ways of modeling the entry behavior of
bidders in terms of the strategy adopted. One model is called pure strategy entry model,
documented in Milgrom and Weber (1982) and Samuelson (1985), in which entry behavior
is governed by a screening level of biddersprivate signals. Within the IPV framework, it
means that there exists a screening level of private values and only bidders whose private
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values are above the screening level enter the auction. The other model is called mixed
strategy entry model proposed in Levin and Smith (1994), in which bidders who have the
same entry cost randomize their entry decisions with a common entry probability. Note that
by assuming that the entry costs follow a nondegenerated distribution, the mixed strategy
entry model is puried to a pure strategy entry model where the entry behavior is governed
by a cut-o¤ point of entry costs. The bidders with entry costs smaller than the cut-o¤ point
participate in the auction and others do not. The key di¤erence between the two types of
models is the timing of acquiring private signals. In the former, bidders know their private
signals prior to entry while they do not know their private signals until after they enter
the auction in the latter and its puried variant. With these theoretical models and their
variants, much empirical work has started to incorporate entry. Athey, Levin, and Seira
(2004) compare the sealed-bid auctions and open auctions with entry by using data from
U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2007) analyze California
Small Business program using highway procurement auction data with an entry and bidding
two stage model within the IPV framework. Both papers adopt the entry model in which
the entry behavior is controlled by the cut-o¤ point of the entry costs. Li and Zheng (2005)
use three di¤erent entry models including degenerated and nondegenerated distribution of
entry costs to study highway mowing auction from the Texas Department of Transportation.
Hortaçsu (2003) study the internet auctions with entry using data from eBay.com.
In view of the importance of a¢ liation and entry, this dissertation closely focuses
on these two issues in rst-price auctions, aiming at three goals. First, it develops a simple
approach to test for a¢ liation among biddersprivate information and applies the approach
to the timber auction data in Oregon State. Second, it extends the APV model by taking
entry into account with symmetric or asymmetric bidders. Lastly, it empirically analyzes
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the timber auction data in Oregon State by using the structural approach within the APV
paradigm with entry and asymmetric bidders and study several policy related issues by
counterfactual analyses. Although this dissertation includes three essays covering various
topics, all incorporate a¢ liation and entry.
In the rst essay, we propose a simple approach to test for a¢ liation in a more
general framework, namely the a¢ liated value (AV) model, developed by Milgrom and
Weber (1982). The test makes use of the information on biddersentry behavior and is based
on the insight that a¢ liation among bidders leads to a¢ liation among their entry behavior.
The approach transforms the a¢ liation test problem to testing the positive correlation of
a multivariate normal distribution. The test then is conducted through a simulation based
method. We apply the test to the timber auctions organized by Oregon Department of
Forestry (ODF) and nd that bidders are a¢ liated with a small level. The proposed test is
simple to implement and is widely applicable to various auction scenarios.
The second essay studies the APV model with entry and establishes an interesting
relationship between the number of potential bidders and bids. Whether to encourage the
competition is a question a seller should ask himself before designing an auction. Within
the IPV framework without entry, competition is benecial for the seller in that higher
competition makes bidders bid more aggressively. It turns out, however, that it is not
necessarily the case within the APVmodel with entry. Previously studied by Pinkse and Tan
(2005) within the APV framework without entry and Li and Zheng (2005) within the IPV
framework with entry, the relationship becomes more complicated in the model we studied.
In this essay, we show that in the APV model with entry, there are three e¤ects at work,
namely competition e¤ect, a¢ liation e¤ect and entry e¤ect, which have di¤erent
e¤ects on bids, therefore the total e¤ect on bids really depends on the relative magnitudes
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of these three e¤ects. We disentangle the total e¤ect analytically and demonstrate it through
an example.
The last essay extends the model in the second essay by considering asymmetric
bidders. We develop a two stage entry and bidding model with asymmetric bidders within
the APV framework and establish the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium of the
model, which is an extension of Lebrun (1999, 2006) who considers the IPV model without
entry with N asymmetric bidders. Unlike the model in the second essay, there is no closed
form for the equilibrium bid, which substantially complicates the estimation. In view of
this we adopt a two step indirect inference method along with a numerical method solving
equilibrium bids to estimate the parameters of the underlying distributions. We apply the
model to the timber auctions in Oregon State, and identify the a¢ liation among private
values and among entry costs. Using the structural estimates, we also quantify the e¤ects
of reserve prices, a¢ liation level and merger, to which the theory provides no guidance,
through a set of counterfactual analyses.
The dissertation, especially the last essay, also contributes to the structural esti-
mation of auction models, which was started with Paarsch (1992) who tests the IPV model
against the CV model. Unlike the reduced form analysis, structural analysis of the auction
data identies the underlying distributions of private values and entry costs, which helps
researchers to examine the e¤ects of some exogenous variables such as reserve prices through
counterfactual analyses without worrying about the Lucas Critique.It assumes that the
observed bids and entry behavior are the results of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. One issue
associated with that is the high dependence of the structural analysis on the information
structure. Di¤erent information structures such as IPV, CV, and APV result in di¤er-
ent equilibria and therefore di¤erent estimation results. While much work focuses on the
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IPV framework, e.g. Donald and Paarsch (1993, 1996) for the maximum likelihood estima-
tion; La¤ont, Ossard and Vuong (1995) for the simulated nonlinear least square estimation
(SNLLS); Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong for the two-step nonparametric estimation; Li and
Zheng (2005) for the semiparametric estimation of an entry and bidding model; Athey,
Levin and Seira (2004), and Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2007) for IPV model with entry
and two types of asymmetric bidders, some researchers have studied structural estimation
within the APV framework. For example, Li, Perrigne and Vuong (2000, 2002, 2003) and
Campo, Perrigne and Vuong (2003) nonparametrically estimate an APV model in various
settings. Li, Paarsch and Hubbard (2007) study an APV model of highway procurement
auctions in Michigan Department of Transportation. Due to the complexity of the model in
the third essay, we adopt a simulation-based approach called indirect inference to conduct
the structural estimation. The approach avoids nding the likelihood function as in MLE
and moment conditions as in GMM or SNLLS. It requires the calculation of the equilib-
rium bids, which do not have analytical forms and therefore are solved numerically and is
computationally intensive.
The application of this dissertation has been focused on the timber auctions in Ore-
gon. Due to the richness of timber auction data in the U.S. and elsewhere, timber auctions
have been intensively studied from various perspectives. Baldwin, Marshall, and Richard
(1997) study the possible bidder collusion at U.S. Forest Service timber sales. Brannman
and Froeb (2000) study the merger, cartel and bidding preferences using the timber sales
data in Oregon Department of Forestry. Haile (2001) study the bidding behavior in timber
sales when bidders take the possible resale afterward into account. Li and Perrigne (2003)
study the timber auctions with random reserve prices. Athey, Levin, and Seira (2004) uti-
lize the U.S. Forest Service timber sales data to compare the sealed-bid and open auctions.
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Lu and Perrigne (2008) propose a nonparametric estimation of risk aversion by using both
open and sealed-bid timber sales. While the aforementioned work adopts an IPV framework
without entry except Athey, Levin, and Seira (2004) and Li and Zheng (2007), who study
entry and bidding in timber auctions, this dissertation studies timber sales in Oregon State
within the APV framework with entry and asymmetric bidders.
Timber Auctions Data in Oregon State
This section describes the timber auctions data in Oregon State used in the rst
and third essays. Before an auction is advertised, the ODF cruisesthe selected tract of
timber and obtains information of the tract, such as the composition of the species, the
quality grade of the timber and so on. Based on the information it obtains, the ODF sets
its appraised price for the tract, which serves also as the reserve price. After the cruise,
a detailed bid notice is usually released 4-6 weeks prior to the sale date, which provides
information about the auction, including the date and location of the sale, species volume,
quality grade of the timber, appraised price as well as other related information. Potential
bidders acquire their own information or private values through di¤erent ways and decide
whether and how much to bid. Bids are submitted in sealed envelopes that are opened at a
bid opening session at the ODF district o¢ ce o¤ering the sale. The sale is awarded to the
bidder with the highest bid. All the sales are therefore rst price sealed bid scale auctions.
The original data contain 415 sales and 1501 observed bids in total from January
2002 to June 2007. To avoid the skewed bidding issue discussed in Athey and Levin
(2001) we remove the sales with more than one bid species. In order to make the auctions
as homogeneous as possible, we only make use of sales with Douglas-r as the bid species,
since it is the dominant bid species accounting for about 92%. Some sales are dropped due
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to the missing value. Therefore the nal sample includes 282 sales and 1139 observed bids.
For each sale, we directly observe some sale-specic variables including the location
and the region of the sale, appraised price, appraised volume, length of the contract, and
diameter at breast height (DBH) as well. Noting that the bid species is often a combination
of a mixture of several grades of quality, we use number 1, 2,    , up to 18 to denote
the letter-grades used by ODF so that the nal grade of a sale is the weighted average of
grades with volumes of grades as the weight. In addition to sale-specic variables, as shown
in Brannman and Froeb (2000), hauling distance is an important bidder-specic variable
that a¤ects biddersbidding decisions. However, hauling distance is not observed directly.
We construct the hauling distance variable by transferring the location of a tract into
latitude and longitude through the Oregon Latitude and Longitude Locator1 and nding
the distances between the tract and the mills of rms by using Google Map. To control the
potential heterogeneity arising from the three locations and three types of sale, we construct
four dummy variables, which are Region 1, Region 2&3, Clear and Recovery and Combo
and Recovery.
The key information related to endogenous entry is the identities of potential
bidders, which are not observed. Unlike some procurement auctions, where information on
bidders who have requested bidding proposal is available and can be used as a proxy for
potential bidders (Li and Zheng (2005)), we do not have such information in our case, as
is usual for timber sale auctions. Therefore we follow Athey, Levin, and Seira (2004) and
Li and Zheng (2007) to construct potential bidders. Specically, we rst divide all sales
in the original data set into 146 groups, each of which contains all sales held in the same
district in the same quarter of the same year. The potential bidders of a sale are then all
1It is available at http://salemgis.odf.state.or.us/scripts/esrimap.dll?name=locate&cmd=start
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bidders who submit at least one bid in the sales of the group that the sale belongs to. In
other words, all auctions in the same group have the same set of potential bidders. Note
that in constructing the potential bidders we use the original data set including all auctions
removed from the nal sample. Summary statistics of the data are given in Table 1.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
Observation Mean Std. Dev.
Entry Behavior 2055 0.5543 0.4972
Distance 2055 78.8476 47.1271
Bids 1139 386.8127 103.0914
Volume 282 3256.7520 2622.2350
Duration 282 781.5390 225.6230
Grade 282 10.2935 0.4549
DBH 282 16.5670 4.8455
# of Poten. Bidders 282 7.2872 2.9897
Region 1 282 0.8262 0.3796
Region 2&3 282 0.1596 0.3669
Clear, Recovery 282 0.4007 0.4909
Combo, Recovery 282 0.2731 0.4463
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CHAPTER II
TESTING FOR AFFILIATION USING ENTRY BEHAVIOR
Introduction
First introduced by Milgrom and Weber (1982), a¢ liation has been widely used
and has become an important concept in the development of auction theory. In the seminal
paper by Milgrom and Weber (1982), a¢ liation is the crucial assumption of the main
results in the paper. It implies the existence of a symmetric, increasing, pure strategy
equilibrium for the rst price auction and is the basis of the well known revenue ranking,
that is under a¢ liation, the English auction has a higher expected revenue than the second
price auction which in turn has a higher expected revenue than the rst price auction. This
revenue ranking result for a¢ liated bidders is in sharp contrast to the celebrated revenue
equivalence result for independent bidders established by Vickrey (1961). Furthermore,
in Rodriguez (2000) a¢ liation implies uniqueness of a monotone equilibrium in a two-
person rst-price auction with symmetric or asymmetric bidders. While recent work (e.g.
Monteiro and Moreira (2006) and de Castro (2007)) has shown that for the existence
and uniqueness of the monotone pure strategy equilibrium, a¢ liation is somewhat stronger
and can be relaxed, the revenue ranking crucially relies on the a¢ liation assumption.1
Furthermore, two standard implications derived under the assumption of the independent
private signals do not hold any more when biddersprivate signals are a¢ liated. First, the
1While de Castro (2007) derives a similar revenue ranking under a weaker assumption, it holds in a weaker
sense in that it holds on average with respect to all functions of a set under consideration. As a result, for
a specic density function in the set, the revenue ranking may break down. Under a¢ liation, however, for
each a¢ liated density function, the revenue ranking always holds.
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e¤ect of the number of potential bidders on bids is not always positive with a¢ liation as
in the independent private value (IPV) model due to the a¢ liation e¤ect (Pinkse and
Tan (2005)). Second, while the optimal reserve price under the IPV framework is always
higher than the true value of the seller and independent of the number of bidders (Riley
and Samuelson (1981), Myerson (1981)), it converges to the true value of the seller as the
number of bidders increases within the a¢ liated private value (APV) paradigm as shown
in Levin and Smith (1996).2
A¢ liation has also played a key role in the structural analysis of auction data,
which was started with Paarsch (1992) who tests the IPV model against the common value
(CV) model, which are two polar cases of the a¢ liated value (AV) model studied in Milgrom
and Weber (1982). Since the structural approach is to estimate an econometric model that
is closely derived from theory, the assumption made on the underlying information structure
is a key to the validity of the structural model. From an econometric point of view, failure in
identifying a¢ liation among bidders may cause biased estimates of the structural parameters
and result in misleading policy conclusions. For instance, one could overestimate bidders
private values when adopting the IPV paradigm for an actual APV model (Li, Perrigne,
and Vuong (2002)). From a policy perspective, since one of the main advantages of the
structural approach is to address policy related issues such as the optimal reserve price
that should be used in an auction given the mechanism, it is important to assess whether
biddersprivate values are a¢ liated or independent given that the optimal reserve prices are
quite di¤erent from each other under these two scenarios. In the empirical work using the
structural approach, a¢ liation has been assumed by several studies. See, e.g. Li, Perrigne
and Voung (2000) for the conditional independent private information (CIPI) model of
2Li, Perrigne and Vuong (2003) derive an explicit formula for the optimal reserve price in the symmetric
APV model in terms of the joint distribution of the biddersprivate values. The formula shows that the
optimal reserve price implicitly depends on the number of bidders.
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O¤shore Continental Shelf (OCS) wildcat auctions, Li, Paarsch and Hubbard (2007) for the
APV model of highway procurement auctions in Michigan Department of Transportation.
Therefore, it is both interesting and important to test for the a¢ liation among bidders
using eld data.
In this chapter, we propose a simple approach to test for a¢ liation among the
private information of bidders. Our test builds on the AV model of Wilson (1977) and
Milgrom and Weber (1982) and take into account entry and endogenous participation. As
is evidenced from the recent work (e.g., Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003), Athey, Levin and Se-
ria (2004), Li and Zheng (2005, 2007), and Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2007)), entry is an
important feature in auctions that should be taken into account in empirical analyses of
auction data. We show that a¢ liation among potential biddersprivate information (either
private signals or entry costs) leads to a¢ liation among their entry decisions. Our test is
then proposed based on this implication. From an econometric viewpoint, since our test
is based on capturing a¢ liation through potential biddersentry behavior, which can be
modeled through a multivariate binary choice framework, we propose a simulated maxi-
mum likelihood estimation procedure extending the GHK methods developed by Geweke
(1991), Börsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1993), and Keane (1994) to our setting. It is worth
noting that our approach allows not only for testing for a¢ liation, but also for testing for
asymmetry among potential bidders. It is thus general and exible, and can be applied to
various scenarios.
To the best of our knowledge, this chapter is the rst one in the literature that
proposes a test for a¢ liation among potential biddersprivate information using potential
biddersentry behavior. The recent work by de Castro and Paarsch (2008) and Jun, Pinkse
and Wan (2008) has proposed to use bids to test for a¢ liation in auctions without entry.
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Notably, Jun, Prinkse and Wan (2008) apply their test to three data sets from the OCS,
California Department of Transport, and Russian Federal Subsoil Resources Management
Agency, and nd that in most of the cases they cannot reject a¢ liation between bids and
the number of bidders. They interpret this as most likely driven by endogenous entry,
highlighting the importance of taking entry into account when testing for a¢ liation. It is
worth noting that testing for a¢ liation using information from observed bids in a general
framework with entry is complicated for several reasons. First, even for a symmetric AV
model without entry, La¤ont and Voung (1996) show that the private information cannot
be identied without additional restrictions. Thus it is di¢ cult to assess the validity of
the a¢ liation assumption using a structural approach. Second, when entry is introduced
to the analysis, using only observed bids to test for a¢ liation becomes challenging as ob-
served bids are now from actual bidders who enter the auction and submit bids, while the
a¢ liation is presumably an assumption made about the dependence structure across all
potential biddersprivate information that can a¤ect both entry and bidding. In particular,
without knowing enough about how bidders enter the auction, and whether the entry cost
is dependent of the private signal, it is di¢ cult for a researcher to decide whether to treat
the observed bids as having a sample selection problem to start with when trying to use
the observed bids to test for a¢ liation. Furthermore, there are some situations where using
observed bids to test for a¢ liation could lead to misleading conclusions with entry process.
For instance, in the IPV paradigm, if potential biddersentry costs are a¢ liated, and they
do not draw their private values until after the entry, and they decide whether to enter the
auction based on comparing their entry costs with the expected prot from entering and
winning, then it can be shown that observed bids are still independent, although the entry
costs are a¢ liated. The literature on testing implications from auction models, which has
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been developed since Hendricks and Porters pioneering work in 1980s (e.g. Porter (1995)
for a survey of the work by Hendricks and Porter), on the other hand, has mainly focused
on testing between private values and common values. For example, Paarsch (1992) esti-
mates the structural models with a set of specications within the IPV and CV paradigms
and compares the goodness-of-t of the specications. Haile, Hong, and Shum (2003) test
common values using an insight from the e¤ect of the winners curse on equilibrium bids.
Hendricks, Pinkse and Porter (2003) propose a test for common values when there is a
binding reserve price and using bids and the ex post realization of the auctioned objects
value. The insight that is used in our testing procedure is that a¢ liation assumed in the
joint distribution of private values or the joint distribution of entry costs implies a¢ liation
among their entry decisions. Therefore an a¢ liation test can be proposed based on the
potential biddersentry behavior without using bidding information.
Since our approach is based on the testable implication of a¢ liation on entry be-
havior, the observed entry behavior is a key in our approach. While auctions with entry have
been studied since 1980s (e.g., Levin and Smith (1994), Samuelson (1985), among others),
the empirical analysis of auction data with entry has only drawn considerable attention
recently. Several studies have attempted to analyze auction data taking endogenous partic-
ipation into account. See, e.g. Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) for internet auctions with entry
using data from eBay.com, Athey, Levin and Seira (2004) for entry and bidding patterns in
sealed bid and open auctions with heterogeneous bidders, Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2007)
for the bid preference program and participation in California highway procurement, De
Silva, Kosmopoulou and Lamarche (2007) for the e¤ect of information release on entry and
survival in procurement auctions, Li and Zheng (2005) for entry and competition e¤ects
in procurement auctions, and Li and Zheng (2007) for evaluating how bidders make entry
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and bidding decisions in Michigan timber auctions. Our test contributes to this part of
the literature by exploiting the implication of a¢ liation of private signals or of entry costs
among potential bidders to form an intuitive and easy-to-implement test for a¢ liation. On
the other hand, a caveat of our test is that it is a reduced form in nature, and a conrmation
of a¢ liation from the test can only indicate that there is an a¢ liation among potential bid-
dersprivate information. A further analysis such as a structural analysis should be used to
disentangle the driving force for the a¢ liation of entry behavior, and to measure the extent
to which private signals or/and entry costs are a¢ liated.
We demonstrate our test by applying the test to timber auctions organized by
Oregon Department of Forestry (hereafter ODF). We nd that bidders are a¢ liated. Also
bidders are asymmetric in the sense that the hauling distance is highly signicant in bidders
entry decisions. Our empirical application in timber auctions is interesting in its own right,
in addition to serving as an illustration to our proposed testing procedure. Timber auctions
have been studied extensively in the empirical literature, because the various auction formats
have been used and provided researchers a ground for testing theory and comparing revenues
from di¤erent auction formats, and also because of the richness of timber auction data in the
U.S. and elsewhere.3 Most of the (structural) empirical work in studying timber auctions,
however, has used the IPV paradigm. We nd through using our test in the ODF data that
the a¢ liation is signicant though at a relatively low level, which turns out to be the rst
result in the literature to assess a¢ liation in timber auctions.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes two alternative entry
models within the general AV framework and derive an implication of a¢ liation among
biddersprivate information on entry behavior, which is the theoretical foundation of our
3The work includes Paarsch (1997), Baldwin, Marshall and Richard (1997), Brannman and Froeb (2000),
Haile (2001), Athey and Levin (2001), Li and Perrigne (2003), Haile, Hong and Shum (2003), Athey, Levin
and Seira (2004), Li and Zheng (2007), among others.
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test. The testing procedure is proposed in Section 3. In Section 4, we apply our test to
timber sales organized by ODF. Section 5 concludes.
The Theoretical Framework
In this section we consider a rst-price sealed-bid auction within the AV paradigm
with a public reserve price r, where a single object is auctioned o¤ to N risk-neutral po-
tential bidders, extending the framework in Milgrom and Weber (1982) to accommodate
asymmetric bidders. A¢ liation is a terminology describing the dependence among random
variables, which is equivalent to multivariate total positivity of order 2 (MTP2) in the mul-
tivariate statistics literature (Karlin and Rinott (1980)). Here we use the same denition
of a¢ liation as in Milgrom and Weber (1982).
Denition 1 Let y and y0 be any two values of a vector of random variables Y  RN
with a density f (). It is said that all elements of Y are a¢ liated if f (y _ y0) f (y ^ y0) 
f (y) f (y0) ; where y _ y0 = (max fy1; y01g ; : : : ;max fyn; y0ng) and y ^ y0 = (min fy1; y01g ;
: : : ;min fyn; y0ng) :
Intuitively, a¢ liation means that large values for some of the components in Y
make other components more likely to be large than small. Also, as shown in Milgrom and
Weber (1982), for a twice continuously di¤erentiable density f (), it is a¢ liated if and only
if for i 6= j, @2 ln f=@yi@yj  0, that is, ln f is super-modular.
We denote the utility of bidder i from the object by Ui = ui (S; V ) ; where V is a
N -dimensional vector with support of [v; v]N ; whose i-th element Vi represents the private
signal of bidder i; and S is an m-dimensional vector representing additional information.4
Denote F (s; v) and f (s; v) the joint distribution and the joint probability density of S and
4Such a setup nests both IPV paradigm and CV paradigm. See Milgrom and Weber (1982) for detail.
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V , respectively. Moreover, all potential biddersentry costs (k1; :::; kN ) are drawn from a
joint distribution G(). F (; ) and G() are common knowledge to all potential bidders.
We consider two pure strategy entry models. The rst model, referred to as
Model 1, assumes that all potential bidders do not draw their private signals until af-
ter they decide to enter. Therefore, the entry cost in Model 1 can be interpreted as
consisting of both information acquisition cost and bid preparation cost. The second
model, referred to as Model 2, assumes that all potential bidders rst draw their pri-
vate signals, and then decide whether to enter the auction. In this case, the entry cost
mainly consists of bid preparation cost. Specically, in Model 1, denote potential bid-
der is expected prot from entering the auction by i, and the event that he enters
the auction by ai = 1. Then i =
P
a i2A i
R v
v i (vija i) dFi (vi) Pr (a ijai = 1), where
a i 2 A i = f(a1; : : : ; aN ) jaj = 0 or 1; j = 1; : : : N; j 6= ig is one possibility of the 2N 1
combinations of entry decisions of N   1 other potential bidders, i (vija i) is bidder is
prot at the bidding stage conditioning on his winning and on that his actual competitors
set is a i. Note that i (vija i) = (Ui   bi) Pr (B i < bijvi; a i), where bi is bidder is bid
at the bidding stage given a i, and B i denotes the maximum bid among other actual
bidders.5 For potential bidder i, he will enter the auction if i > ki; his ex ante expected
prot from entering the auction exceeds the entry cost, otherwise, he will stay out.6
Model 2, on the other hand, assumes that for potential bidder i, i = 1; :::; N , he
5Since we are interested in using potential bidders entry behavior to infer a¢ liation, we focus on the
entry stage model, but not on the bidding stage. This can be viewed as an advantage of our approach, as
what is required here is only the existence of a bidding equilibrium.
6Recently various simpler versions of Model 1 have been studied in the empirical auction literature. For
example, Athey, Levin and Seira (2004) and Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2006) study a similar entry model
within the IPV paradigm with two types of bidders, Li and Zheng (2005) study the symmetric version of
the model within the IPV paradigm.
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rst draws a private signal vi, and then compares vi with the screening level dened as
vi = inf

vijE

(Ui   r) 1
 
Vj < v

j ; j 6= i
  kijVi = vi   0	 : (II.1)
As a result, the screening levels for all potential bidders (v1; :::; vN ) constitute solutions to
a system of N equations given by (II.1) for i, i = 1; :::; N . For potential bidder i, he only
becomes an actual bidder and submits a bid if his private signal exceeds the screening level,
vi > v

i .
7
Note that in both models, the entry behavior of each potential bidder in an auction
is determined by a cut-o¤ point either for the entry cost (in Model 1), or for the private
signal (in Model 2). It is then natural to think of a¢ liated bidders as more likely to have
similar entry behavior. For instance, in Model 2, suppose that two biddersprivate signals
are a¢ liated and bidder 1 has a high private signal, which is above v1: By the denition
of a¢ liation, it is more likely that bidder 2 a has high private signal as well. Therefore
the probability that both bidders 1 and 2 participate in the auction should be no less than
the probability that bidder 1 participates and bidder 2 does not. The following proposition
formalizes this intuition.
Proposition 1 Let D = (D1; : : : ; DN ) 2 f0; 1gN denote bidder 1,   , bidder N 0s entry
decisions.
(1) In Model 1, if k1; :::; kN are a¢ liated, then D1; : : : ; DN are also a¢ liated.
(2) In Model 2, If V1; : : : ; VN are a¢ liated, then D1; : : : ; DN are also a¢ liated.
7This entry model, extending the symmetric entry model in Milgrom and Weber (1982) to the asymmetric
case, is in a similar spirit to the one proposed by Samuelson (1985) within the IPV paradigm, in which
potential potential bidders rst draw their private values and adopt a pure strategy in their entry decision.
An alternative entry model is developed by Levin and Smith (1994), and further studied in Li (2005) and
Li and Zheng (2005), in which bidders make entry decision before learning their private information and
therefore, their entry behavior is randomized, and under the symmetry assumption, each bidder has the
same probability of participation.
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Proof. (1) In Model 1, Di is dened as Di = 1 (ki < i) and thus is a non-
increasing function of ki: If k1; :::; kN are a¢ liated, following Theorem 3 in Milgrom and
Weber (1982), D1; : : : ; DN are a¢ liated.
(2) In Model 2, Di is dened as Di = 1 (Vi > v) and thus is a non-decreasing
function of Vi: If V1; : : : ; VN are a¢ liated, following Theorem 3 in Milgrom and Weber
(1982), D1; : : : ; DN are a¢ liated.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that the theoretical framework we adopt in modeling
potential biddersentry decisions gives rises to a¢ liation among biddersentry behavior as
a result of a¢ liation in biddersprivate information, either entry costs as in Model 1, or
private signals as in Model 2. This is an intuitive result, and constitutes a basis upon which
our test for a¢ liation is proposed.
The A¢ liation Test
The insight we gain from the previous section is that a¢ liation among potential
biddersprivate information (either private values or entry costs) leads to a¢ liation among
their entry decisions. Therefore we propose to test for a¢ liation among biddersprivate
information by testing for a¢ liation among their entry decisions. Since in practice we
usually deal with a large number of (heterogeneous) auctions, we assume that we observe a
1 k1 auction-specic covariate vector, denoted by x`, ` = 1; :::; L, where L is the number
of auctions in the data set. For auction ` in the data, there are N` potential bidders. To
control for the possible asymmetry among potential bidders, we include a 1  k2 bidder-
specic covariate vector denoted by z`i, i = 1; :::N`. We dene D`i to be 1 if potential
bidder i enters the `-th auction and 0 otherwise. We use a binary choice model to model
21
the entry decision as follows,
D`i = 1 (x` + z`i + ` + "`i > 0) (II.2)
where ` denotes the auction heterogeneity unobserved by the econometrician,
8 and "`i
denotes idiosyncratic error unobserved by the econometrician, and independent of x`, z`i,
and `. Note here that we adopt a linear representation for the reduced form payo¤
function in modeling the entry decision, in which case, the payo¤ function can be arising
either from a potential bidders comparison of his entry cost with his cut-o¤ level of expected
prot as in Model 1, or from his comparison of his private signal with his cut-o¤ level as
in Model 2. Our approach can accommodate more general and exible functional forms for
the reduced form payo¤ function. The next proposition links the a¢ liation among D`i to
the a¢ liation among "`i:
Proposition 2 If "`1; : : : ; "`N` are a¢ liated, then D`1; : : : ; D`N` are a¢ liated.
Proof. It follows the fact that D`i is a non-decreasing function of "`i:
Testing for a¢ liation among D`i now amounts to testing for a¢ liation among
"`i in our setting. To implement the test, we further assume that `; "`1; : : : ; "`N` follow
a joint normal distribution with mean  = (0; : : : ; 0)0 and covariance (N`+1)(N`+1) =266666666664
2 0    0
0 1 
...
. . .
0  1
377777777775
; implying that ` is independent of "`i, and "`i and "`j have a correlation
denoted by , the same across all the potential bidders/auctions. Under our setting, 
represents the a¢ liation among "`1; : : : ; "`N` . This follows from Sarkar (1969) and Barlow
8As shown in Krasnokutskaya (2003), controlling for unobserved auction heterogeneity can be important
in applications.
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and Proschan (1975) who show that for X = (X1;    ; Xn)  N (0;
) ; X1; : : : ; Xn are
a¢ liated if and only if the o¤-diagonal elements of matrix  
 1 are nonnegative, which
implies, in our case, that "`1; : : : ; "`N` are a¢ liated if and only if   0: As a result, we
can construct the following hypotheses to test for a¢ liation among the private signals of all
potential bidders,
H0 :   0;
H1 :  < 0:
A by-product of our setting is that the symmetry assumption can be tested by testing
 = 0, since the possible asymmetry among potential bidders is accommodated by the
bidder-specic variables z`i.
A Smoothly Simulated Maximum Likelihood Estimator
The problem now becomes estimating the unknown parameters  = (; ; ; ) in
the binary latent variable model. Under the specications given above, we can write down
the joint likelihood function for all N` potential bidders at the `-th auction in terms of their
entry decisions. For instance, the likelihood of all potential bidders participating in the `-th
auction is
p`() = Pr (D`i = 1; i = 1; : : : ; N`)
=
Z +1
 1
Z +1
 1
  
Z +1
 1
1 ("` 2 A`) f ("`1; : : : ; "`N` ; `) d"`1    d"`N`d`
= E`
Z +1
 1
  
Z +1
 1
1 ("` 2 A`) f" ("`1; : : : ; "`N`) d"`1    d"`N`

; (II.3)
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where A` denotes the set f"`j"`i >   (x` + z`i + ) ; i = 1; : : : ; N`g and the last equality
follows from the independence assumption of "`1; : : : ; "`N` and `. Similarly, we can express
the likelihood of entry/non-entry of all potential bidders at all other auctions. In principle,
 can be estimated by MLE with the joint log-likelihood function dened as
$ (D;x; z; ) =
LX
`=1
ln p` () :
There are a couple of complications arising from implementing the MLE here.
First, p`() involves multiple (N`+1) integrations. Therefore when the number of potential
biddersN` is large, the MLE becomes computationally intensive because of the large number
of multiple integrals involved. This issue can be addressed through using the simulation
based method to approximate the otherwise di¢ cult-to-calculate integrals. Second, with
the use of the simulation based method, the objective function may become non-smooth
due to the index function 1 ("` 2 A`) : To address both issues, we adopt a smooth and
unbiased simulator often called the GHK simulator after Geweke, Hajivassiliou, and Keane,
which is found to be the most reliable method for simulating normal rectangle probability
among others (e.g. Hajivassiliou, McFadden and Ruud (1996)). Specically, in our case, the
covariance matrix of "`i is
P
N`
=
26666664
1 
. . .
 1
37777775
N`N`
. There must exist a lower triangular
matrix h` such that h`  h0` =
P
N`
. Then "` = ("`1; : : : ; "`N`)
0 can be written as "` = h``;
where ` =
 
`1; : : : ; `N`
0 follows N`-variate standard normal distribution. Since h` is a
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lower triangular matrix, we have the following recursive formula for "`i:
"`1 = h`;11`1 (II.4a)
"`2 = h`;21`1 + h`;22`2 (II.4b)
... (II.4c)
"`N` = h`;N`1`1 +   + h`;N`N``N` ; (II.4d)
where h`;ij = h` (i; j) : Then we can make simulation draws based on such a decomposition.
For example, the probability that all bidders participate in the `-th auction p` () in equation
(II:3) can be written as the following form
p` () = Ev
Z +1
 1
  
Z +1
 1
1 (` 2 B`) f
 
`1; : : : ; `N`

d`1    d`N`

= Ev
Z +1
 1
  
Z +1
 1
g (x`; z`; l; v; jv) eg (x`; z`; l; v; jv) d`1    d`N`
= Ev [E (g (x`; z`; l; v; jv))]
= E (g (x`; z`; l; v; )) ;
where eg (x`; z`; l; v; jv) = 1 (` 2 B`) (1)`N`g(x`;z`;l;v;jv) ; B` is the set derived from A` accord-
ing to the transformation (II:4) ; v = = and g (x`; z`; l; v; jv) =
h
1  

 x` z`1 v
h`;11
i

  
h
1  
 x` z`N` v h`;N`11  h`;N`N` 1`N` 1
h`;N`N`
i
: The second last equality follows
the fact that
(1)

`N`

g(ljv) 1 (` 2 B`) is actually a joint density function of ` condi-
tional v: As a result, p` () can be approximated by ep` () = 1T PTt=1 gt (x`; z`; l; v; ) and
gt (x`; z`; l; v; ) is simulated by the following procedure.
Step 1. First draw v from N (0; 1) and calculate 1  

 x1 v
h11

:
Step 2. Draw `1 fromN (0; 1) truncated at
 x` z`1 v
h`;11
from below, and calculate
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1  
  x` z`2 v h`;21`1
h`;22
 `1 :
...
StepN`. Draw `N` 1 fromN (0; 1) truncated at
 x` z`N` v h`;N`11  h`;N`N` 2`N` 2
h`;N` 1N` 1
and calculate 1  
  x` z`N` v h`;N`11  h`;N`N` 1`N` 1
h`;N`N`
 `1; : : : ; `N` 1 :
Dene the corresponding simulated likelihood function as follows
e$ (D;x; z; ) = LX
`=1
ln ep` () :
Following Börsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1993), a smoothly simulated maximum likeli-
hood estimator (SSMLE) can be proposed as
bSSMLE = argmax

e$ (D;x; z; ) :
In practice, to guarantee that  is between -1 and 1 and  is positive, we make two trans-
formations, namely,  = 21+exp(e)   1 and  = exp (e) :
As the SSMLE is essentially one type of the simulated maximum likelihood esti-
mator, bSSMLE has the same asymptotic normal distribution as that of the usual MLE as
the number of simulations, T; is large enough in the sense that T=
p
L ! 1: Let sl () =
r (ln pl ())0 ; then
p
L
bSSMLE   ! N (0;) ; where  = E [s0` () s` ()] 1(e.g. Train
(2003)).
Note that here ("`1; : : : ; "`N`) is assumed to follow a multivariate normal distrib-
ution, in which case, the GHK simulation method can be used to conduct the simulated
maximum likelihood estimation. Our approach can be viewed as assuming a Gaussian cop-
ula for the joint distribution of ("`1; : : : ; "`N`) with standard normal marginal of "`i, and can
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be extended to other specications of the multivariate distribution for ("`1; : : : ; "`N`), such
as non-normal distributions for the marginal distributions of "`i, and a Gaussian copula for
the joint distribution.9 In the same vein albeit a more general setting, a semiparametric
approach can be developed extending the generalized bivariate probit model (Chen and
Zhou (2007)), which leaves the marginal distributions of "`i unspecied, to the multivariate
case we consider here, though the computation intensity can be high.
A¢ liation in Oregon Timber Auctions
This section applies our testing procedure to the timber sales organized by the ODF
from January 2002 to June 2007. All auctions are held as rst-price sealed-bid auctions and
in a format of scale auctions.
Since we will focus on the entry behavior of the potential bidders to infer a¢ liation,
we highlight the histogram of the entry proportion of the data in Figure 1, where the entry
proportion is dened as the ratio between the number of the actual bidders and the number
of potential bidders. Figure 1 presents some interesting features. As one can see from this
gure, the auctions which have more than 90% entry proportion have the largest frequency.
The number of auctions which have less than 30% or greater than 70% entry proportions
is 160, which is a bit above a half of the total number of auctions in the data set. This can
be viewed as an indication of a small level of a¢ liation among potential bidders.
Results
Table 2 presents the estimation results, which are obtained through the SSMLE
with the number of simulations T = 100: Since our primary goal is to test for a¢ liation,
9For the concept of copula, which is to model joint distributions given marginal distributions, see Nelsen
(1999). For using the copula approach to model joint distributions in auction models, see Li, Paarsch and
Hubbard (2007). We also discuss it in detail in Chapter IV.
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we are mainly interested in the estimate of , which turns out to be 0.2281 with a standard
error equal to 0.0493. This result suggests that  is signicant and therefore bidders are
a¢ liated. But the magnitude of  indicates that the level of a¢ liation is not high, though
signicant. This is consistent with the nding through the simple analysis of the entry
proportion. The standard deviation of the unobserved heterogeneity is quite small and
insignicant, which implies that the variables we use to control for auction heterogeneity
have captured most of the auction heterogeneity that a¤ects potential biddersentry deci-
sion. Another interesting nding is that the hauling distance matters in the entry behavior
and one percentage increase in the hauling distance will decrease the probability of entry
by about 8.75% on average. As a result the hypothesis of symmetric bidders is rejected.
This means that the hauling distance not only a¤ects biddersbidding behavior as found in
Brannman and Froeb (2000), but also a¤ects potential biddersentry decisions. As far as
auction-specic covariates are concerned, except that the duration of a contract and DBH
are not signicant, the estimates of all other covariates are intuitive. Potential bidders are
more likely to enter the auction with higher volume or higher quality, as suggested by the
positive coe¢ cients of the log volume and log grade. On the other hand, the negative coef-
cient of the number of potential bidders implies that the competition may deter potential
biddersparticipation, which is consistent with the theoretical results in the literature (e.g.
Li and Zheng (2005) for the relationship between the entry probability and the number of
potential bidders).
To assess the robustness of our results, following a referees suggestion, we re-
conduct the estimation using an alternative denition of potential bidders by dening po-
tential bidders as all companies that participated in an auction in the same district in the
previous 12 months, instead in the same quarter of the same year. We nd that the estimate
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for  is about 0.1, and also signicant, again supporting the a¢ liation hypothesis, though
the estimated a¢ liation level is smaller than the one obtained using our original denition of
potential bidders. Furthermore, we have also tried nonlinear specications for the reduced
form payo¤ function to check the sensitivity of the estimate for  to the specication of
the payo¤ function. For instance, when the square of the number of potential bidders is
included, the estimated  becomes 0.186 and also signicant. These results demonstrate
the robustness of the estimate of , and thus of the proposed test.
Conclusions
A¢ liation is an important assumption that has been used in both theoretical and
empirical frameworks in studying auctions. It is thus an important econometric issue as to
how to test for a¢ liation using eld data. In this chapter, we propose a novel approach to
test for a¢ liation. Using observed bids to test for a¢ liation is di¢ cult when entry is present.
We circumvent this problem by using only potential biddersentry behavior based on the
insight that a¢ liation among potential biddersprivate information implies the a¢ liation
among potential biddersentry behavior.
Our testing procedure requires the estimation of a multivariate probit model. It
is general as it can accommodate various scenarios such as asymmetric bidders and unob-
served auction heterogeneity. We propose the SSMLE to estimate the model as the SSMLE
overcomes computational complexity associated with the estimation and makes the estima-
tion computationally tractable. It is worth noting that while our primary goal is to test for
a¢ liation, our testing procedure can also be used to verify some other assumptions such as
symmetry among bidders.
We apply our approach to the timber auctions held by ODF. Our results indicate
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that the a¢ liation among potential biddersentry decisions is signicant but of a small level.
Furthermore, the potential bidders entry decisions are a¤ected by the hauling distance,
meaning that the potential bidders are heterogeneous. These ndings o¤er insight and
guidance in terms of structural modeling, as in view of these results, a structural model
that is used to study the timber auctions organized by ODF should take into account
the a¢ liation among biddersprivate values or/and biddersentry costs, and asymmetry
among potential bidders. In particular, from a policy viewpoint, how the optimal reserve
price should be set according to the level of a¢ liation of private signals/entry costs can be
addressed through the structural approach.
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Table 2. Estimation Results
Estimates Std. Error
Log of Volume 0:1496 0.0732
Log of Duration 0:014 0.1535
Log of Grade 5:3086 2.3448
Log of DBH  0:3006 0.3863
Potential Bidder  0:0755 0.0158
 0:2281 0.0493
 0:1560 3.6562
Log of Distance  0:2064 0.0223
 denotes 5% signicance.
 The estimates and standard errors are the
transformed ones.
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Figure 1. Histogram of Entry Proportion
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CHAPTER III
AFFILIATION EFFECT, ENTRY EFFECT AND COMPETITION EFFECT
Introduction
This chapter studies the relationship between the number of potential bidders
and bids when potential biddersprivate values are a¢ liated and their entry decisions are
endogenous. It decomposes the e¤ect of the number of potential bidders on bids into three
e¤ects, namely competition e¤ect,entry e¤ectand a¢ liation e¤ect,which can have
di¤erent signs and interact altogether resulting in an ambiguous relationship between the
number of potential bidders and bids.
While theoretical models of entry in auctions have been developed since 1980s,
most of the work has focused on the IPV model. See, e.g., Samuelson (1985), McAfee and
McMillan (1987), Levin and Smith (1994), Harstad (1990), and Kjerstada and Vagstad
(2000) among others. This chapter studies theoretical implications of APV model with en-
try. In particular, it investigates the relationship between the number of potential bidders
and bids, which has been an important issue in the auction literature. As established in
Pinkse and Tan (2005), in the APV model without entry, in addition to the usual compe-
tition e¤ect, there is an additional e¤ect specic to a class of APV models and opposite
to the competition e¤ect,which they term as the a¢ liation e¤ect.For the IPV model
with entry, Li and Zheng (2005) identify what they call entry e¤ect that is opposite to
the competition e¤ectas well. This chapter shows that within the APV framework with
entry, in addition to the competition e¤ect, both a¢ liation e¤ect and entry e¤ect
32
are at work. As a result, the overall relationship between the number of potential bidders
becomes ambiguous, and depends on the relative magnitudes among these three e¤ects.
Therefore, quantifying these e¤ects and thus determining the overall relationship between
the number of potential bidders and bids calls for a structural analysis of the auction data
with the APV model and endogenous entry.
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theo-
retical APV model with entry and public reserve prices. Section 3 studies the relationship
between the number of potential bidders and bids by decomposing the e¤ect of the num-
ber of potential bidders into the three e¤ects analytically. Section 4 presents an example
showing non-monotonic relationship between the number of potential bidders and bids and
quanties the total e¤ect and three e¤ects. Section 5 concludes.
Models
Based on the AV model developed by Milgrom and Weber (1982), we consider an
APV model with entry. Consider a rst-price sealed-bid auction, in which a single object
is auctioned o¤ to N homogenous and risk-neutral potential bidders with a public reserve
price r.
Prior to the auction, bidders draw their private values v from the joint distribution
of F (v1; : : : ; vN ) with the support of [v; v]N ; and make their participation decisions ac-
cordingly. Bidder i incurs an entry cost ki and submits a bid bi if he decides to participate in
the auction. The bidder with the highest bid wins the object and pays the amount he bids.
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Due to symmetry, we look at bidder 1 in the following analysis without loss of generality.
Entry Decision
A non-trivial entry cost k, which mainly includes the preparation cost, may deter
bidder 1 from entering the auction depending on his private value. Therefore before deciding
how much to bid, bidder 1 has to make participation decision rst. As is shown in Milgrom
and Weber (1982) in the symmetric case the entry decision is governed by a screening level
of the private values v: Only bidders who have private values greater than the screening
level will participate in the auction.1 The bidder c (denoting the cut-o¤ bidder whose
private signal is v) is indi¤erent from entering and not entering the auction, therefore v
is determined by the zero prot condition:
(v   r)FV 1jv1 (v; : : : ; vjv) = k; (III.1)
where FV 1jv1 (v2; : : : ; vN jv) denotes the conditional joint distribution of V2; : : : VN condi-
tioning on V1 = v:
As one can see, the entry leads to the cut-o¤ point that functions as a binding
reserve price and thus changes the set of bidders who are willing to participate in the auction
to compete.
Bidding Strategy
In the bidding stage, actual bidders submit their bids, which are determined by
maximizing their expected prots conditional on their private signals. For bidder 1, his bid
1This entry model is a general model in that it includes the one proposed by Samuelson (1985) and
further studied in Li and Zheng (2005, 2007) as a special case as the latter model considers the symmetric
IPV paradigm. Another alternative entry model is developed by Levin and Smith (1994), in which bidders
make entry decisions before learning their private information and their entry behaviors are randomized.
Under the symmetry assumption, each bidder has the same probability of participation.
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is determined by the following maximization problem
max
b1
(v1   b1) Pr (Bj < b1jV1 = v1; j 6= 1) ; v1 2 [v; v] :
As in the literature, we consider a strictly increasing Bayesian Nash bidding equilibrium
b1 = s (v1) : In terms of the conditional joint distribution FV 1jv1 ; the maximization problem
can be written as follows,
max
b
(v   b)FV 1jv1
 
s 1 (b) ; : : : ; s 1 (b) jv ; v 2 [v; v]
where subscript 1 is suppressed due to symmetry and s 1 is the inverse function of bidding
function.
The optimal bids are characterized by the rst order condition of the maximization
problem given in the following,
 FV 1jv1 (v; : : : ; vjv) + (v   s (v)) (N   1)F2;V 1jv1 (v; : : : ; vjv)
1
@s(v)
@v
= 0
and a boundary condition s (v) = r; where F2;V 1jv1 (v2; : : : ; vN jv) =
@FV 1jv1 (v2;:::;vN jv)
@v2
.
The bidding strategy can be solved as
b = v   L (vjv)
Z v
v
L (uju) 1 du+ L (vjv) (r   v) ; (III.2)
where L (vjv) = exp

  R vv (N 1)F2;V 1jv1 (t;:::;tjt)FV 1jv1 (t;:::;tjt) dt

:
The equilibrium of this game can be viewed as two parts, entry equilibrium and
bidding equilibrium. In the entry equilibrium, there is a screening level of the private value
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for each bidder. Each bidder chooses participation as his strategy if his private value is
above the screening level and stays out otherwise. The equilibrium bid is given by equation
(III:2) : Although the model is illustrated through two parts, compared with the model
with mixed entry strategy in Li and Zheng (2005), which extends Levin and Smith (1994),
it is indeed a one stage game, since the private values are drawn prior to entry.
A¢ liation E¤ect, Entry E¤ect and Competition E¤ect
This section is devoted to analyzing the relationship between bids and the number
of potential bidders within the APV paradigm with entry. As is well known, due to the
competition e¤ect in the IPV model without entry, a higher level of competition makes
bidders more aggressive, leading to a higher revenue to the seller. It is, however, not always
the case when the entry is taken into account since there is an entry e¤ect(Li and Zheng
(2005)) representing the e¤ect of the number of potential bidders on bids through the entry
stage, which is opposite to the competition e¤ect.On the other hand, Pinkse and Tan
(2005) nd that in the APV model without entry, in addition to the competition e¤ect,
another e¤ect called a¢ liation e¤ecthas negative e¤ect on bids. Similar to the winners
curse e¤ect in the CV model, the winner in the APV model would think that he/she
overestimates the common e¤ect which a¤ects his/her valuation. By taking this e¤ect into
account before they submit their bids and trying to alleviate this e¤ect, bidders reduce their
bids. It is shown in this section that in the model considered in the previous section all
these three e¤ects are at work. Before decomposing these three e¤ects we rst introduce
two straightforward comparative statics.
Proposition 3 Let C denote the corresponding copula of the joint distribution F and C11
denote the second derivative with respect to the rst argument: Suppose C11 is nonnegative.
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As the entry cost k increases, the screening level v increases as well.
Proof. In terms of copula, FN 1j1 (v; : : : ; vjv) = C1 (F0 (v) ; : : : ; F0 (v)) : We
know that C1 (F0 (v) ; : : : ; F0 (v)) is increasing in v if
NX
i
C1i (F0 (v
) ; : : : ; F0 (v))  0:
Since C1i > 0 for i 6= 1; the inequality follows from C11  0:
This condition is easily met by many copulas, such as Frank copula, Clayton
copula, and Gumbel copula.
Proposition 4 Suppose C11 is nonnegative. As the number of potential bidders increases,
the screening level v increases as well.
Proof. From zero prot equation (III:1) in the entry stage, the entry cost can
be viewed as a function of v and N; k = k (v; N) : Taking derivative with respect to
N; we have dkdN =
@k
@v
@v
@N +
@k
@N : Since both k and N are exogenous,
dk
dN = 0; leading to
@v
@N =   @k@N = @k@v : @k@v is positive and @k@N is negative, which are clearly seen from equation
(III:1), therefore the result follows.
The intuition of this proposition is, as in Li and Zheng (2005), that since the entry
cost remains the same, the average number of actual bidders should not change either. As
a result, if the number of potential bidders increases, in order to keep the average number
of actual bidders unchanged, v has to increase.
The next two propositions show that the total e¤ect of the number of potential
bidders on bids is a result of the competition e¤ect,the entry e¤ectand the a¢ liation
e¤ect in the model. Before moving to the total e¤ect of N; we rst focus on the partial
e¤ect of N; that is the e¤ect on bids holding v xed.
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Proposition 5 Fixing entry strategy, that is xing v; the e¤ect of N on bids is ambiguous.
Proof. From the optimal bidding equation (III:2), @b@N is equal to the following,
@b
@N
=  @L (vjv)
@N
Z v
v
L (uju) 1 du  L (vjv)
Z v
v
@L (uju) 1
@N
du+
@L (vjv)
@N
(r   v)
=

L (vjv)
Z v
v
R2 (t) dt
Z v
v
L (uju) 1 du  L (vjv)
Z v
v

L (uju) 1
Z u
v
R2 (t) dt

du
 L (vjv)
Z v
v
R2 (t) dt (r   v)

+

L (vjv)
Z v
v
@ [(N   1) (RN (t) R2 (t))] =@Ndt
Z v
v
L (uju) 1 du
 L (vjv)
Z v
v

L (uju) 1
Z u
v
@ [(N   1) (RN (t) R2 (t))] =@Ndt

du
 L (vjv)
Z v
v
@ [(N   1) (RN (t) R2 (t))] =@Ndt (r   v)

 bN1 + bN2;
where RN (v) =
F2;V 1jv1 (t;:::;tjt)
FV 1jv1 (t;:::;tjt)
; and R2 (v) =
F2;V2jv1 (tjt)
FV2jv1 (tjt)
: The terms in the rst brackets,
denoted by bN1 is positive since R2 (t) > 0 and r < v; while sign of the terms in the second
brackets, denoted by bN2; is ambiguous depending on the joint distribution of private values.
We illustrate it using two di¤erent cases.
Case 1: If FV 1jv1 (vjv) satises the strict monotone likelihood ratio property
(MLRP) with respect to N; bN2 > 0. Then @b@N > 0. (see Matthews (1987)).
Case 2: Like Pinkse and Tan (2005) we consider a conditional independent private
values (CIPV) paradigm, a special case of APV model. Suppose biddersprivate values
V1; : : : ; VN are a¢ liated through a random variable Z; and independent from each other
conditional on z: Let FCIPV (vjz) and fCIPV (vjz) denote conditional distribution and den-
sity of Vi given Z = z; and GCIPV (z) and gCIPV (z) be the distribution and density of Z:
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Under this setting,
F2;V 1jv1 (t;:::;tjt)
FN 1j1(t;:::;tjt) and
F2;V2jv1 (tjt)
FV2jv1 (tjt)
can be written as follows
F2;V 1jv1 (v; : : : ; vjv)
FV 1jv1 (v; : : : ; vjv)
=
R z
z F
N 2
CIPV (vjz) f2CIPV (vjz) gCIPV (z) dzR z
z F
N 1
CIPV (vjz) fCIPV (vjz) gCIPV (z) dz
;
F2;V2jv1 (vjv)
FV2jv1 (vjv)
=
R z
z f
2
CIPV (vjz) gCIPV (z) dzR z
z FCIPV (vjz) fCIPV (vjz) gCIPV (z) dz
:
Assume that FCIPV satises MLRP, the proposition 1 in Pinkse and Tan (2005) shows that
@ [(N   1) (RN (v) R2 (v))] =@N < 0; implying that bN2 < 0: The desired result follows.
Proposition 6 There is no monotone relationship between bids and the number of potential
bidders.
Proof. From the optimal bidding equation (III:2) ; the bid is a function of N
and v; can be written as b = b (N; v) : Then dbdN =
@b
@N +
@b
@v
@v
@N : Proposition 4 shows that
@v
@N > 0; and
@b
@v
= L (vjv) (N   1)RN (v)

r   v   2
Z v
v
L (uju) 1 du

  2L (vjv) < 0;
which implies @b@v
@v
@N < 0: On the other hand,
@b
@N has an undetermined sign illustrated in
proposition 3. Therefore the result follows.
As can be seen from the proofs of Proposition 5 and 6, we have actually decomposed
the e¤ect of the number of potential bidders into three parts, denoted by dbdN = bN1+ bN2+
@b
@v
@v
@N :
@b
@v
@v
@N is called the entry e¤ectas in Li and Zheng (2005), since the number of
potential bidders a¤ects bids through v; which controls the equilibrium entry strategy. As
the number of potential bidders increases, the entry e¤ectmakes bidders less aggressive.
bN1 denotes the competition e¤ect which is positive and bN2 represents the negative
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a¢ liation e¤ect.In the IPV framework, bN2 = 0; since RN (v) R2 (v) = 0:
An Example
In this section we illustrate the nonmonotonicity by a concrete example, which is
mainly based on the example in Pinkse and Tan (2005), and quantify the total e¤ect and
the three e¤ects. Suppose a common factor z has two possible values z1 = :01 and z2 = 2
with probabilities g1 = :15 and g2 = :85: Biddersvalues v 2 [0; 1] are a¢ liated through z
but independent from each other conditional on z; with conditional distribution,
F0 (vjz) = exp

z

1  v 

;where  = 1;
which satises MLRP. In addition to this, there is a reserve price r = :1 and an entry
cost k = :05: We set the entry cost small in order to make sure that the entry e¤ect is
not too large, which otherwise might dominate the competition e¤ecttogether with the
a¢ liation e¤ectand make the bids monotonically decreasing in N: Two bidding functions
corresponding to N = 3 and N = 6 are calculated and presented in Figure 2. It is clearly
shown that the bids associated with 6 potential bidders is not always larger than the bids
associated with 3 potential bidders. When the private value lies between [0:4; 0:71] ; the bids
with 3 potential bidders are larger. The di¤erence of two bidding functions or the total e¤ect
of the change in the number of potential bidders is presented in Figure 3, represented by the
solid line. The other three lines represent the competition e¤ect,the entry e¤ect,and
the a¢ liation e¤ect.As is seen and expected, the competition e¤ectis always positive,
and the entry e¤ectand the a¢ liation e¤ectare negative. The entry e¤ect is quite
small, very close to zero, which is consistent the setup of the small entry cost in the example.
40
The dominance of the a¢ liation e¤ectin the range of [0:4; 0:71] is the reason which causes
the nonmonotonicity of bids and the number of potential bidders.
Conclusion
Within the APV framework with entry, the relationship between with the number
of bidders and the bids is not as clear as that within the IPV framework. The e¤ect
of the number of potential bidders depends on the relative magnitudes of three e¤ects:
competition e¤ect, entry e¤ect and a¢ liation e¤ect. For a given data, quantifying
these e¤ects calls for the structural analysis to estimate the underlying distributions.
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CHAPTER IV
AFFILIATION AND ENTRY WITH HETEROGENEOUS BIDDERS
Introduction
A celebrated result in auction theory is Vickreys (1961) revenue equivalence theo-
rem, which postulates that all the four auction formats (rst-price sealed-bid, second-price
sealed bid, English, and Dutch auctions) generate the same average revenue for the seller
with symmetric, independent, and risk-neutral bidders. It is a powerful result that o¤ers
insight into how auction mechanisms work, and also raises important questions as to how
this powerful result can be a¤ected when the standard assumptions are relaxed. A large
part of the auction theory has focused on answering these questions. Milgrom and Weber
(1982) give revenue ranking with symmetric and a¢ liated bidders in which the English auc-
tion generates highest revenue among the four formats and the second-price auction ranks
next; they also establish that with symmetric, a¢ liated, and risk-averse bidders who have
constant absolute risk aversion, the English auction can generate at least as high revenue
as the second-price auction. Myerson (1981) derives the optimal auctions with asymmetric
bidders, and Maskin and Riley (1984) consider the case with risk-averse bidders. Levin and
Smith (1994) extend the revenue equivalence and ranking results from Vickrey (1961) and
Milgrom and Weber (1982) to the case with symmetric bidders (independent or a¢ liated)
using mixed entry strategies.
Using timber sale auctions organized by the Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF),
this chapter attempts to address a set of questions that include with heterogeneous bidders
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and when entry is taken into account, how the sellers revenue could change with the extent
to which the biddersprivate values are a¢ liated, and whether the reserve price currently
set by the ODF is optimal with respect to maximizing the sellers revenue/prot. More-
over, merger and bidder coalition have been an important issue to economists interested in
competition policy, yet no empirical work has studied this issue taking into account partici-
pation from potential bidders. That we consider heterogeneous bidders is motivated by the
evidence from the previous work studying the timber auctions in Oregon (e.g. Brannman
and Froeb (2000) using data consisting of oral auctions, and what we nd in Chapter II
using the same data used in this chapter), that hauling distance plays an important role
in biddersbidding (Brannman and Froeb (2000)) and entry (Chapter II) decisions. This
means that bidders are asymmetric and heterogeneous. Furthermore, in chapter II we nd
small but strongly signicant level of a¢ liation among potential biddersprivate informa-
tion (either private signals or entry costs) and Brannman and Froeb (2000) demonstrate the
importance of a¢ liation to the merger application. Lastly, recent empirical work in auctions
in general and in timber auctions in particular (e.g. Athey, Levin and Seira (2004), Bajari
and Hortaçsu (2003), Kransnokutskaya and Seim (2007), Li and Zheng (2005, 2007)) has
demonstrated that bidders participation and entry decision is an integrated part of the
decision making process that has to be taken into account when studying auctions. In view
of these, in this chapter we attempt to study the timber auctions organized by the ODF
within a general framework in which potential bidders are a¢ liated and heterogeneous, and
they make entry decisions before submitting bids.
Auction theory o¤ers little guidance in answering these questions for auctions with
entry and asymmetric potential bidders with a¢ liated private values. On the other hand, to
gain insight on these questions from an empirical perspective, one needs to observe two states
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of world, such as pre and post the change of the a¢ liation level, or pre and post merger.
Usually in auction data, as is the case in our data, however, one cannot observe these two
states of world. Therefore we adopt a structural approach in our empirical analysis. In
particular, we estimate a game-theoretic auction model within the APV paradigm with
asymmetric bidders and with entry. We then use the estimated structural parameters to
conduct counterfactual analyses of our interest. We nd that for a representative auction,
the optimal reserve price should be much larger than the current one. In evaluating the
merger e¤ects we nd that the merged bidder is very likely to participate in the auction
regardless of the merging biddersentry behavior and that the merger has little impact on
other biddersentry behavior. While the overall merger e¤ect on the sellers revenue is not
theoretically clear in our model, we nd that at the current reserve prices and dependence
levels, merger is benecial to the seller, but it could mean a loss for the seller for some
values of reserve price and dependence levels.
We develop an entry and bidding model for asymmetric bidders within the APV
paradigm. Because of the general framework we adopt, the answers to the aforementioned
questions of our interest depend on the interactions of a¢ liation, entry, and asymmetry,
as well as competition. As is well known, the optimal reserve price in the symmetric IPV
model without entry does not depend on the number of potential bidders. This result
can change if entry is introduced (see, e.g., Levin and Smith (1994), Samuelson (1985), Li
and Zheng (2007)), or if bidders have a¢ liated private values (Levin and Smith (1996),
Li, Perrigne, and Vuong (2003)). In our case, on the other hand, assessing the optimal
reserve price is complicated further by the APV framework with entry and asymmetric
bidders. Therefore we can only address this issue through a counterfactual analysis using
the structural estimates. Furthermore, while the e¤ect of the number of potential bidders
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on winning bids and sellers revenue is clear in an IPV model with symmetric bidders and
without entry, it becomes less clear in a more general setting, such as the IPV model with
entry and symmetric bidders (Li and Zheng (2005, 2007)), and the APV model without
entry (Pinkse and Tan (2005)). In Chapter III we nd that in the symmetric APV model
with entry, three e¤ects, namely a¢ liation e¤ect,entry e¤ectand competition e¤ect
interact together resulting in an ambiguous total e¤ect of the number of potential bidders
on bids. While we expect these three e¤ects to remain in the APV framework with entry
and asymmetric bidders, it becomes challenging to pinpoint them with asymmetric bidders.
Since the e¤ect of merger is closely related to how the sellers revenue changes with the set
of potential bidders, i.e, not only the number of potential bidders, but also the identity of
potential bidders when they are heterogeneous, and at the same time, theory does not yield
good predictions, we rely on the structural analysis to gain insight on this issue.
Asymmetry is an indispensable element of the model given the asymmetric feature
of the data. The analysis of the model, however, is complicated from both theoretical and
econometric viewpoints due to the introduction of asymmetry. Because of the complexity of
the model, and in particular, because that there is no closed form solution for the bidding
function, we have to rely on some numerical approximation procedure. Moreover, while
the structural analysis of auctions with asymmetric bidders has focused on the case with
two types of bidders (Athey, Levin, and Seira (2004), Campo, Perrigne and Vuong (2003),
and Kransnokutskaya and Seim (2007)), our model allows for all potential bidders to be
di¤erent from each other, motivated by the fact that in our data, asymmetry is driven by
the di¤erence among biddershauling distances.
As mentioned in Chapter I, this chapter makes contribution to the growing liter-
ature of the structural analysis of auction data since Paarsch (1992). While the structural
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approach has been extended to the APV paradigm, this chapter is the rst one in estimating
a structural model within the APV paradigm and taking into account entry. On the other
hand, while the recent work has started to pay attention to the problem of participation
and entry, all the work has focused on the IPV framework with Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003)
being an exception as they consider a common value (CV) model. In contrast, this chapter
considers the entry problem within the APV paradigm, a more general framework.
Our empirical analysis of the timber auctions and the resulting ndings o¤er new
insight on timber sale auctions and policy related issues. While most of the empirical
analysis of timber sale auctions is based on the IPV model without entry (e.g. Paarsch
(1997), Baldwin, Marshall and Richard (1997), Haile (2001), Haile and Tamer (2003), Li
and Perrigne (2003)) or the IPV model with entry (Athey, Levin and Seira (2004), Li and
Zheng (2007)), ours is based on the APV model with entry and heterogeneous bidders. As
a result, our ndings can be more robust, and also can be more useful for addressing the
policy-related issues as our analysis takes into account the a¢ liation e¤ect, the entry e¤ect,
and the asymmetry e¤ect. Moreover and probably more interestingly, we study the merger
e¤ect within the asymmetric APV framework with entry, and o¤er new insight into how
merger as well as other issues related to competition policy can be a¤ected by complications
arising from a¢ liation, entry, and asymmetry, and how they can be addressed within a
unied framework as adopted in this chapter.1
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2 we propose the asymmetric APV
model with entry. Section 3 is devoted to the structural analysis of the data, and Section
4 conducts a set of counterfactual analyses studying the e¤ects of reserve prices, a¢ liation
1It is worth noting that to the best of our knowledge, Brannman and Froeb (2000), considering oral
timber auctions within an IPV paradigm without entry, is the only paper assessing the merger e¤ect in
auctions using the structural approach.
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levels, and mergers. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
In this section we propose a theoretical two-stage model to characterize the timber
sales, extending the models in Athey, Levin, and Seira (2004) and Krasnokutskaya and Seim
(2007) with two groups of bidders within the IPV paradigm, and in Li and Zheng (2005)
within the symmetric IPV paradigm, to the APV paradigm that allows potential bidders to
be di¤erent from each other. Specically, motivated by the nding of Brannman and Froeb
(2000) that the hauling distance plays a signicant role in biddersbidding decision in oral
timber auctions in Oregon, and the nding of Chapter II using the same data studied in
this chapter that the hauling distance is important in potential biddersentry decision and
potential bidders are a¢ liated through their private information (either private values or
entry costs), we consider a rst-price sealed-bid auction within the APV paradigm with a
public reserve price, entry, and asymmetric bidders.
In the model, a single object is auctioned o¤ to N heterogenous and risk-neutral
potential bidders, who are a¢ liated in their private information. Bidder i has a private entry
cost ki; including the cost of obtaining private information and bid preparation, and does
not obtain his private value vi until he participates in the auction. We allow both private
values and entry costs to be a¢ liated across bidders, that is V1; : : : ; VN and K1; : : : ;KN
jointly follow a distribution F (; : : : ; ) with the support of [v = r; v]N , and a distribution
G (; : : : ; ) with the support of k; kN , respectively, where r is the public reserve price of
the auction. A¢ liation is a terminology describing the positive dependence among random
variables, which was rst introduced into the study of auctions by Milgrom and Weber
(1982). In this chapter, it shares the same denition given in Chapter II.
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We denote the marginal distribution and density of bidder is private value by Fi()
and fi() and marginal distribution and density of bidder is entry cost by Gi () and gi (),
respectively, and assume that fi () is continuously di¤erentiable and bounded away from
zero on [v = r; v] : The subscript of distribution function implies that all potential bidders
are of di¤erent types. This assumption is motivated by the fact that heterogeneity among
bidders arises from di¤erent hauling distances in our data.
The model di¤ers the one considered in Chapter III in two ways. First it allows
for asymmetric bidders. Second, the timing of acquiring private values is di¤erent.
Bidding Strategy
Because the entry decision is based on the pre-entry expected prot, which depends
on the bidding strategy of bidder i, we rst describe the bidding strategy of bidder i. We
assume that bidder i knows the number of the actual competitors in the bidding stage,2 and
thus bidder is bidding strategy is determined by the rst order condition of the following
maximization problem,
max (vi   bi) Pr (Bj < bijvi; a i) ;
where Bj denotes the maximum bid among other actual bidders and
a i 2 A i = f(a1; : : : ; aN ) jaj = 0 or 1; j = 1; : : : N; j 6= ig
is one possibility of the 2N 1 combinations of entry decisions of N   1 other potential
bidders. Denote the number of actual bidders of the combination a i by na i : As usual we
2When the lower support of private value is below the reserve price, bidder i only knows the active bidders
who participate in the auction but not actual bidders who submit bids. In our case, the number of active
bidders is equal to the number of actual bidders, since the lower support of private value is assumed to be
just the reserve price.
49
consider a continuously di¤erentiable and strictly increasing bidding strategy, bi = si (vi) ;
therefore the rst order condition is
 FV ijvi

s 1j (bi) ; j 6= ijvi

+ (vi   bi)
na iX
j 6=i
@FV ijvi

s 1j (bi) ; j 6= ijvi

@vj
@s 1j (bi)
@bi
= 0;
(IV.1)
where FV ijvi denotes the joint distribution of Vj ; j 6= i conditional on Vi = vi and s 1i ()
is the inverse function of the bidding function of bidder i: A set of equation (IV:1) for
i = 1; : : : ; n form a system of di¤erential equations characterizing the equilibrium bids for
all n actual bidders. We denote the post-entry prot of bidder i by i (vija i) :
Entry Decision
In the initial participation stage, each potential bidder i only knows his own entry
cost, joint distributions of entry costs and private values. Therefore the entry decision of
bidder i is determined by his pre-entry expected prot from participation, i: Specically,
he participates in the auction only if his entry cost is less then i: Let pi denote the entry
probability of bidder i; respectively. The ex ante expected prot i is given by
i =
X
a i2A i
Z v
v
i (vija i) dFi (vi) Pr (a ijai = 1) ; (IV.2)
where Pr (a ijai = 1) is a function of p = (p1; : : : ; pN ) : As a result, the pre-entry expected
prot is the sum of 2N 1 products of the post-entry prots and corresponding probabilities
with the unknown private value integrated out. On the other hand, the probability of entry
is given by pi = Pr (Ki < i) = Gi (i) :
Note that although the number of potential bidders does not a¤ect the bidding
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strategy in the bidding stage, it a¤ects the number and the identities of actual bidders,
which in turn have impact on the bidding strategy.
Characterization of the Equilibrium
Existence and uniqueness of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium with asymmetric bid-
ders has been a challenging problem studied in the recent auction theory literature. See,
e.g. Lebrun (1999, 2006) and Maskin and Riley (2000, 2003) within the IPV framework,
Lizzeri and Persico (2000) within the APV framework and two types of bidders. The analy-
sis of our model is further complicated by the introduction of a¢ liation and entry, as well
as that we allow all potential bidders to be di¤erent from each other. To address the issue
of existence and uniqueness in our case, we look at the case where the joint distribution
of biddersprivate values is characterized by the family of Archimedean copulas. For the
copula concept and the characterization of the Archimedean copulas, see Nelsen (1999).
Copula can provide a exible way of modeling joint dependence of multivariate variables
using the marginal distributions.
Specically, by Sklars theorem (Sklar (1973)), for a joint distribution F (x1; : : : ; xN ) ;
there is a unique copula C; such that C (F1 (x1) ; : : : ; FN (xN )) = F (x1; : : : ; xN ) : For the
Archimedean copulas, the copula C can be expressed as C (u1; : : : ; un) = [ 1] ( (u1)+
  +  (un)) ; where  is a generator of the copula and is a decreasing and convex func-
tion, and [ 1] denotes the pseudo-inverse of :3 The family of Archimedean copulas in-
clude a wide range of copulas. For example, the generators  (u) = 1q (u
 q   1) ;  (u) =
(  ln (u))q ; and  (u) = ln

exp(qu) 1
exp(q) 1

correspond to the widely used Clayton copula,
3 is a decreasing convex function from [0; 1] to (0;1] with  (1) = 0: [ 1] is dened as
[ 1] (u) =

 1 (u) ; 0  u   (0) ;
0;  (0)  u  1:
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Gumbel copula, and Frank copula, respectively. Since we consider a di¤erentiable bid-
ding strategy, we have to conne ourself to the strict generator, that is [ 1] =  1: Since
Ci (F1 (x1) ; : : : ; FN (xN )) = FX ijxi (x1; : : : ; xN ) (e.g. Li, Paarsch, and Hubbard (2007)),
the rst order condition (IV:1) determining the equilibrium bids can be written as follows
ds 1i (b)
db
=
 10
 P
k 
 
Fk
 
s 1k (b)
 
na i   1

0
 
Fi
 
s 1i (b)

fi
 
s 1i (b)

 100
 P
k 
 
Fk
 
s 1k (b)
(IV.3)24X
k 6=i
1
s 1k (b)  b
  na i   2
s 1i (b)  b
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and Pr (a i; p1; : : : ; pN jai = 1) ; for example, for the case that given the participation of
bidder i; bidder 1 up to bidder i   1 participate in the auction while bidder i + 1 up to
bidder N do not, can be expressed as
Pr (a1 =    ai 1 = 1; ai+1 =    aN = 0jai = 1) (IV.4)
=
Pr (a1 =    ai = 1; ai+1 =    aN = 0)
Pr (ai = 1)
where
Pr (a1 =    ai = 1; ai+1 =    aN = 0)
= C (p1; : : : ; pi; 1; : : : ; 1; qk) 
X
i+1jN
C (p1; : : : ; pi; pj ; 1; : : : ; 1; qk)
  + ( 1)N iC (p1; : : : ; pN ; qk) ;
and Pr (ai = 1) = C (1; : : : ; 1; pi; 1; : : : ; 1; qk) :
Equilibrium of the model consists of two parts, entry equilibrium and bidding
equilibrium. Based on the choice of Archimedean copulas for the joint distribution of private
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values, the existence of the equilibrium is guaranteed. Moreover, with some additional
conditions, the bidding equilibrium is unique. The next paragraph describes the equilibrium
formally.
Proposition 7 (Characterization of Equilibrium) Assume (a) the marginal distribu-
tion of entry cost of bidder i, Gi is continuous over

k; k

for all i; (b) marginal distribution
of private value of bidder i is di¤erentiable over (v; v] with a derivative fi locally bounded
away from zero over this interval for all i; (c) joint distribution of private values follows an
Archimedean Copula.
i. Bidding Equilibrium In the bidding equilibrium, bidder i adopts a contin-
uously di¤erentiable and strictly increasing bidding function bi = si (v) over (v; v]: The
inverse functions of si for all i; s 11 ; : : : ; s
 1
n are the solution of the system of di¤erential
equations (IV:3) with boundary conditions (IV:5) and (IV:6) :
s 1i (v) = v (IV.5)
s 1i () = v: (IV.6)
for some .
ii. Uniqueness of Bidding Equilibrium Moreover, if Fi (v) > 0 and
 10(u)
 100(u)
is decreasing in u, then the bidding equilibrium is unique.
iii. Entry Equilibrium In the entry equilibrium, bidder i chooses to participate
in the auction if his entry cost is less than the threshold i (p) and stay out otherwise, where
p = (p1; : : : pN ) and pi is the entry probability of bidder i and is determined by
pi = Gi (i (p)) : (IV.7)
53
As is seen here, the existence of the entry equilibrium is equivalent to the existence
of the entry probability pi; given by the equation (IV:7) : Since i is continuous in pi and
thus Gi is continuous over [0; 1] ; there exists a solution pi of equation (IV:7) ; according to
Kakutanis xed point theorem (Kakutani (1941)). To show the uniqueness of the bidding
equilibrium is to show that there is a unique  such that s 1i () = v: Then starting from
; according to Lipschitz uniqueness theorem, s 1i is unique over (v; ]: Note that Clayton
copula satises the condition for uniqueness that 
 10(u)
 100(u) is decreasing in u: The formal
proofs are provided in Appendix A.
The Structural Analysis
We estimate the model proposed in the last section using the timber sales data.
Our objective is to recover the underlying joint distributions of private values and entry
costs using observed bids and the number of actual bidders. The structural inference in
our case is complicated because of the generality of our model that accounts for a¢ liation,
asymmetry, and entry. Our approach circumvents the complications arising from the es-
timation of our model and makes the structural inference tractable. First, to model the
a¢ liation in a exible way, we adopt the copula approach in modeling the joint distribution
of private values and the joint distribution of entry costs.4 Second, since we allow bidders
to be asymmetric, the system of di¤erential equations consisting of equation (IV:3) that
characterizes biddersBayesian Nash equilibrium strategies does not yield closed-form so-
lutions. To address this problem we adopt a numerical method based on Marshall, Meurer,
4Li, Paarsch, and Hubbard (2007) use the copula approach to model a¢ liation within the symmetric
APV framework without entry and propose a semiparametric estimation method.
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Richard, and Stromquist (1994) and Gayle (2004). Third, because of the various covariates
we try to control for and the relatively small size of the data set, the nonparametric method
does not work well here. Therefore, we adopt a fully parametric approach.
Specications
We adopt the Clayton copula to model the joint distributions of both private values
and entry costs. With the generator of Clayton copula given above, the joint distribution
of private value is specied as F (v1; : : : vn) =
 P
i Fi (v1)
 qv   n+ 1 1=qv ; and the joint
distribution of entry costs is specied as G (k1; : : : ; kn) =
 P
iGi (v1)
 qk   n+ 1 1=qk ;
where qv and qk are dependence parameters and Fi and Gi are the marginal distribu-
tions of private value and entry cost, which are specied as truncated exponential distrib-
utions given as follows, FV`i (vjx`i;) =
1
v`i
exp

  1
v`i
v

  1
v`i
exp

  1
v`i
v

1
v`i
exp

  1
v`i
v

  1
v`i
exp

  1
v`i
v
 ; GK`i (kjx`i;) =
1
k`i
exp

  1
k`i
k

  1
k`i
exp

  1
k`i
k

1
k`i
exp

  1
k`i
k

  1
k`i
exp

  1
k`i
k
 for bidder i of the `-th auction, ` = 1; : : : ; L; where L is
the number of auctions, v`i and k`i are the private value and entry cost means and equal
exp (x`i) and exp (x`i), respectively, and x`i is a vector of covariates that are auction spe-
cic or bidder specic, and in our case includes variables such as hauling distance, volume,
duration, grade, and DBH.5 In practice, v is equal to the reserve price of `-th auction, v is
equal to $1500/MBF, the lower bound of entry cost is equal to zero and the upper bound k
is $940/MBF, an arbitrarily large number. We then model the joint distributions of private
values and entry costs in auction ` as Clayton copula with di¤erent dependence parameters
qv and qk: The use of the Clayton copula o¤ers several advantages. First, it guarantees the
existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium as discussed in Section 3.3. Second, it preserves
the same dependence structure when the number of potential bidders changes. Third, it is
5Here we do not introduce unobserved auction heterogeneity into the model, as in chapter II we show
that it does not have a signicant e¤ect in biddersentry decisions.
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relatively easy to draw dependent data from the Clayton copula, as it has a closed form
that can be used to draw data recursively. Lastly, since q is the only parameter that mea-
sures the dependence, we can easily evaluate the impact of the dependence level on the end
outcomes of an auction by changing the value of q:
Note that in these specications, the asymmetry across potential bidders is cap-
tured by the inclusion of the hauling distance variable in x`i, while both  and  are kept
constant across di¤erent bidders. This enables us to estimate a relatively parsimonious
structural model and at the same time control for the asymmetry.
Estimation Method
Because of the complexity of our structural model, we employ the indirect inference
method to estimate the model. Initially proposed in the nonlinear time series context
by Smith (1993) and developed further by Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault (1993) and
Gallant and Tauchen (1996), the indirect inference method is simulation based and obtains
the estimates of parameters by minimizing a measure of distance between the estimates for
the auxiliary parameters of an auxiliary model using the original data and simulated data.
More specically, let  denote the vector of parameters of interest,  be the parameters
of the auxiliary model, bT and b(p)ST () be the estimates of the auxiliary model using the
original data and the p-th simulated data out of P sets of simulated data from the model
given a specic , respectively. Then the estimator of , denoted by bST ; is dened as
bST = argmin

24bT   1P
PX
p=1
b(p)ST ()
350
"bT   1P
PX
P=1
b(p)ST ()
#
; (IV.8)
where 
 is a symmetric semi-positive denite matrix. Therefore to implement the indirect
inference method, we have to draw data from the model for a given ; which involves
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calculating the equilibrium bids and the thresholds of the entry costs. Basically we use
numerical approximation method similar as the ones in Marshall, Meurer, Richard, and
Stromquist (1994) and Gayle (2004) to nd the equilibrium bids and iteration to nd the
equilibrium entry probabilities, both of which are illustrated in detail in Appendix B.
Though it avoids calculating the likelihood function or moment conditions, indirect
inference requires to solve the equilibrium bids and equilibrium entry probabilities. When
the number of potential bidders is large, it involves intensive computation. As is seen from
equation (IV:2) ; the pre-entry expected prot is a sum of 2N 1 terms, each of which requires
to calculate equilibrium bids numerically. To address this issue, we only use a small portion
of the data, that is we use the observations whose number of potential bidders are no more
than 5, which makes the sample consist of 81 sales and 245 observed bids. The summary
statistics are provided in Table (3) : We propose a two step indirect inference method. In
the rst step, we apply the indirect inference method to the bidding stage only, which gives
us the estimates of the distribution of private values. With these, we apply the indirect
inference to the entry stage again and obtain the distribution of entry costs.
The auxiliary model, which is usually simpler than the original model and easier to
estimate as well, plays an important role in the indirect inference method. In this chapter,
following the idea in Li (2005) we employ a relatively simple and easy-to-estimate auxiliary
model to make the implementation tractable and the inference feasible. Specically, in the
rst step the auxiliary model is a linear regression of the observed bids and it is a Poisson
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regression of the number of actual bidders in the second step, which are described as follows
b` = 10 +
HX
h=1
Xh`11h +
HX
h=1
X2h`12h +   +
HX
h=1
Xmh`1mh + "1;
Pr (n` = k) =
exp ( `)k`
k!
; ` = 20 +
HX
h=1
Xh`21h +
HX
h=1
X2h`22h +   +
HX
h=1
Xmh`2mh;
where b` is the average bid of auction `; and Xh`, h = 1; :::H, denote the vector of auction-
specic covariates of auction ` and the average of bidder-specic covariates, and H is the
number of such covariates, which is 6 in our case. m = 2 makes our model over-identied.
An issue arising from the implementation of the indirect inference method is the
discontinuity of the objective function of equation (IV:8) because of the discrete dependent
variable (the number of actual bidders) in the auxiliary model that makes gradient-based
optimization algorithm invalid. We address this issue by using simplex, a nongradient-based
algorithm. Alternatively, one can follow Keane and Smith (2003) to smooth the objective
function using a logistic kernel.
Estimation Results
Table 4 reports the estimation results. For the (marginal) private value distribu-
tion, all the estimated parameters are signicant at the 5% level, and also have the expected
signs.6 Of particular interest is the parameter of the hauling distance variable, which is used
to control for heterogeneity across bidders. The negative estimate means that the longer the
hauling distance is, the less is the private value mean. Furthermore, the average marginal
e¤ect of the hauling distance variable is about -1.73, meaning that one mile increase in the
distance would reduce the private value mean by $1.73/MBF while everything else is xed.
In other words, one mile increase in the distance could reduce the private value mean by
6Standard errors are obtained through bootstrap.
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0.21%. Another parameter of particular interest is the dependence parameter qv in private
values, which turns out to be relatively small (qv = 0:0983) but signicant. To get some
idea of how large the dependence is with qv = 0:0983; we use a measure called Kendalls 
(Nelsen (1999)), which is used to measure the concordance of random variables. Concor-
dance is not really the same concept as a¢ liation, but measures the positive dependence in
a similar way. Kendalls  is dened as the probability of concordance minus the probability
of discordance for the case with two random variables X and Y .
X;Y = Pr [(X1  X2) (Y1   Y2) > 0]  Pr [(X1  X2) (Y1   Y2) < 0] :
For the Clayton copula, when the dimension of variables is equal to 2, the dependence
parameter and Kendalls  are bundled together by equation  = q=(q+2): Therefore qv =
0::0983 implies that the event of any two biddersprivate values being concordant is about
4.7% more likely than the event of being discordant.
Two points in the estimates in the distribution of entry costs are worth noting.
First, the hauling distance variable is signicant and positive in the entry cost distribution
and its marginal e¤ect is 1.6. Second, the dependence level among the entry costs is 0.5122,
implying a Kendalls  of 0.2. This indicates that the a¢ liation among the entry behavior
is mainly driven by the a¢ liation among the entry costs.
Model Fit
In this subsection, we assess the model t from the structural estimation. Because
our model yields two main outcomes, namely, the number of actual bidders and bids submit-
ted by the actual bidders, we assess the model t through these two outcomes. Specically,
we use the structural estimates to conduct 1000 simulations, each of which contains 81
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auctions. We pool all simulated bids and the simulated number of actual bidders and com-
pare two histograms of the simulated data with those of our sample. The histograms are
provided in Figure 4, from which we can see that the distributions of the simulated data
match the distributions of the original data quite well. The means of the simulated bids and
number of actual bidders are $349.30/MBF and 3.37, respectively, which are quite close to
$376.69/MBF and 3.02 of the sample means.7
Counterfactual Analyses
With the estimated structural parameters we can now answer the questions put
forward in the introduction section empirically. We focus on both end outcomes, namely, the
number of actual bidders, and winning bids (or sellers revenue). We conduct counterfactual
analyses on the 99th auction of our data, which is not included in the estimation sample.
We use this auction as a representative auction, as the values of covariates of this auction
are close to the average values of all auctions in our data set. In particular, the number of
potential bidders in this auction is 7, about the same as the average number of potential
bidders in the data. In doing so we assume that the estimates derived from a subset of the
data t the whole data.
The sellers expected unit revenue is given as follows
E (w) = E (wjw > 0)Pr (w > 0) + E (wjw < 0)Pr (w < 0)
= E (wjw > 0)Pr (w > 0) + v0 Pr (w < 0) ;
7Alternatively we could compare the estimated private value mean and the true private value mean. The
latter, however, is not observed. Through our private communications with a sta¤ at the ODF, the average
private value is within the range of $800/MBF and $1000/MBF. The estimated average private value from
our estimation is about $975.64/MBF, well falling inside this range.
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where w denotes the winning bid and v0 is the valuation of the timber to the seller, and the
second equality follows the assumption that if the timber is not sold successfully then the
seller gets his own value. In the following analyses we assume v0 = 0, thus the expected
revenue is equivalent to the expected prot.
E¤ects of Reserve Price and Dependence Level
Intuitively the e¤ect of the reserve price can be seen from two aspects. On one
hand, a higher reserve price is associated with a lower ex ante expected prot, i.e., a lower
cut-o¤ entry cost according to equation (IV:2) as it narrows the integration range, and thus
fewer participating bidders and lower probability of being sold, which may lower bids in our
APV model with asymmetric bidders. On the other hand, a higher reserve price raises the
lowest acceptable bids and of course makes bidders bid higher. Our counterfactuals shown
in Figure 5 conrm such trade-o¤. The three panels in Figure 5 show how the reserve price
a¤ects the number of actual bidders, the probability of being sold and the sellers revenue.
The number of actual bidders is decreasing in the reserve price as is shown in the rst panel.
The average number of participating bidders drops dramatically from 5.52 to 1.25 when the
reserve price is raised from $293.4/MBF to $1320.4/MBF. The probability of being sold
is negatively related to the reserve price when the reserve price is less than $1000/MBF.
The change in the winning bid is the nal result of all e¤ects associated with change in the
reserve price. As is seen in the last panel, the optimal reserve price is around $704/MBF,
which is more than twice as large as the current reserve price. This implies that when
the reserve price is below $704/MBF the positive e¤ect on the winning bid outweighs the
negative e¤ect associated with the lower probability of being sold.
The APV model we estimated also enables us to quantify the e¤ects of the depen-
dence level among bidders. To this end, we change the values of the dependence parameters
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of both private values and entry costs while keeping other parameters xed. We are able
to conduct such analysis as the change of the dependence parameter does not a¤ect other
parameters, which appear only in the marginal distribution of private values or entry costs.
As in the analysis of the e¤ects of the reserve price, we are interested in three e¤ects of the
dependence parameters. Results are provided in Figure 6 and Figure 7, in which the depen-
dence levels are represented by Kendalls s; which are transformed from the dependence
parameters qv and qk.8 We use  v and k to denote Kendalls s corresponding to qv and
qk: The probability of being sold remains at 1 as dependence levels change which implies
that the dependence levels do not a¤ect the number of participating bidders as much as
the reserve price does. The number of participating bidders is slightly negatively related
with the dependence level of private values. The average number of participating bidders
associated with a high dependence level,  v = 0:6; is only about a half less than the one in
the almost independence case. On the other hand, the number of participating bidders is
not monotone with respect to the dependence level of entry costs, as is seen from the rst
panel of Figure 7. One thing worth noting is that a relatively large increase in the number
of participating bidders is associated with the change of k from almost 0 to 0.1. This is
consistent with the intuition that a¢ liated bidders should have more similar entry behav-
ior, which is also the idea of the a¢ liation test in Chapter II. Moreover, two dependence
parameters have di¤erent e¤ects on the winning bids. Unlike the fact that the dependence
level of entry costs is strongly positively related with the winning bids, the dependence level
of private values does not have a signicant relationship with the winning bids.
8For the Clayton copula,  = 2
d
2d 1
hQd
i=1
1+(i 1)q
2+(d i)q   12d
i
; where d is the dimension of the random vari-
ables, which is equal to 7 in our case.
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E¤ect of Bidding Coalition or Merger
Our asymmetric model is ideal for evaluating the merger e¤ects on the end out-
comes of auctions, because asymmetry is intrinsically involved in the merger. The merged
bidder will be di¤erent from other bidders even if they are symmetric pre-merger. For the
purpose of measuring the e¤ects of bidding coalition or merger, we conduct two hypothet-
ical mergers, the bestand worstmergers. In the bestmerger two least competitive
bidders are merged, which means that two bidders with the longest hauling distances are
merged in our case. On the contrary, in the worstmerger two bidders with the shortest
hauling distances are merged into one entity. On the other hand, according to the pre-
merger entry behavior of the merging bidders, mergers can be divided into three groups:
mergers between two participating bidders, mergers between two non-participating bidders,
and mergers between one participating bidder and one non-participating bidder. It is obvi-
ous that most worstmergers belong to the rst group while most bestmergers belong
to the second group, because strong bidders are more likely to participate in the auction
than weak bidders do. We therefore focus on the merger e¤ects of the rst group worst
mergers and the second group bestmergers. These two polar cases should shed light on
other mergers.
The private value Vm and the entry cost Km of the merged bidder are dened as
Vm = max (V1; V2) andKm = min (K1;K2) ; respectively, assuming that bidder 1 and bidder
2 are merged without loss of generality where m denotes the merged bidder. Therefore the
marginal distributions of private values and entry costs of the merged bidder are dened
as Fm (vm) = C (F1 (vm) ; F2 (vm) ; qv) ; and Gm (km) = eC (1 G1 (km) ; 1 G2 (km) ; qk) in
terms of copula, where eC is the survival copula associated with C: In practice we simulate
3000 auctions based on covariates of the representative auction and conduct best and
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worstmergers for these 3000 auctions and compare the pre-merger and post-merger end
outcomes.
When it comes to the merge e¤ects on entry, we are not only interested in the
merged bidders entry behavior, but also concerned with whether a merger induces non-
participating bidders into the auction or crowds participating bidders out of the auction.
The rst panels of Figure 8 to Figure 13 demonstrate the interactions between entry behavior
of bidders and the reserve price and two dependence levels in both worst and best
mergers. The blue solid lines represent the entry probabilities of the merged bidders. The
red dot lines are the probabilities of staying out of bidders who participated pre-merger
and the probabilities of participation of bidders who did not participated pre-merger are
represented by the green dash lines. As is seen from Figure 8, Figure 9, and Figure 10,
in the bestmergers the merged bidder always participates in the auction for any values
of reserve prices and dependence levels, while in the worstmergers, the merged bidders
participates in the auction with a large probability of more than 0.80 in most cases except for
some high enough reserve prices (Figure 13) and some values of dependence levels of private
values (Figure 12). This is not surprising because the merged bidder has a higher private
value mean and lower entry cost mean. On the contrary the e¤ects of both mergers on
entry behavior of non-merging bidders are negligible, which means almost all non-merging
bidders follow the same entry strategy post-merger. Considering all e¤ects on entry, it is
more likely that the auction loses one participating bidder due to the worstmerger and
gains one participating bidder in the bestbidder.
The changes in the number and identities of participating bidders a¤ect the nal
bids and thus the winning bids through several channels. The rst channel is called the
competition e¤ect.The increase or decrease in the number of participating bidders makes
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bidders more or less aggressive. To the merged bidder in worstmerger, the competition
between two merging bidders is removed due to the merger, which causes the merged bidder
bid less. Second, the merger may a¤ect the bids and winning bids through a¢ liation. Within
the APV framework, a bidder would think that he may overestimate the common factor
which a¤ects all bidders private values when he wins the auction. By taking this into
account and trying to alleviate this e¤ect, the bidder reduces his bid. This e¤ect is called
the a¢ liation e¤ect in Pinkse and Tan (2005) and can make bidders bid more as the
number of potential bidders decreases. Lastly, the merger yields a stronger bidder meaning
a smaller marginal distribution, through which the merger a¤ects biddersbids and possibly
the winning bids. Intuitively this should lower the winning bid in the worstmerger and
raise the winning bid in the bestmerger, because a stronger winner is undesired while a
stronger competitor is desired in terms of the degree of competition. Note that the rst two
channels are essentially through the change in the number of participating bidders and the
last one is e¤ective through the change in identities of participating bidders. How merger
a¤ects the sellers revenue depends on the interactions of these e¤ects. Because of the
complexity of the model we consider, however, analytically we cannot quantity the extent
to which each e¤ect impacts on the sellers revenue. Therefore we can only rely on the
counterfactual analysis to quantity the overall e¤ect of merger on the sellers revenue as we
do here.
The e¤ects on the revenue are presented in the second panels of Figure 8 to Figure
13. The rst thing we note is that at the current levels of reserve price and dependence levels,
both types of merges are benecial to the seller, yielding gains of $113/MBF and $73/MBF
in best merger and worst merger respectively. This implies that the competition
e¤ect and the e¤ect associated with a stronger competitor dominate the other e¤ect in
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the bestmerger, while in the worstmerger the a¢ liation e¤ect might be the dominant
one. The e¤ects on the revenue vary as the reserve price varies. In the worstmerger,
the merger could do harm to the seller for some values of the reserve price, for example,
$700/MBF, as is shown in Figure 8. From Figure 9 and Figure 10, it can be seen that in the
anti-merger, both dependence levels are negatively related with the change in the expected
revenue which implies that high levels of dependence might alleviate the a¢ liation e¤ect
and strengthen the other two e¤ects. On the other hand, in the bestmerger, the negative
relationship between the merger e¤ect on revenue change and the dependence levels is not
that obvious. Like the interaction between the merger e¤ect on the revenue and the reserve
price, the change in revenue due to merger varies as the dependence levels vary as well.
The di¤erence between two types of mergers is that the bestmerger is always benecial
to the seller whatever the dependence levels are but the worstmerger can result in some
loss to the seller at some dependence levels such as k > 0:28 as shown in Figure 9.
To summarize, we nd the following results regarding the merger e¤ects.
i. The merged bidder almost always participates in the auction.
ii. The merger has little impact on non-merging biddersentry behavior.
iii. Both worst and bestmergers are benecial to the seller at the current
levels of reserve price and dependence levels.
iv. The bestmerger is better than worstmerger in terms of the change in the
sellers revenue at the current levels of reserve price and dependence levels.
Conclusion
In this chapter we study how a¢ liation and entry can a¤ect biddersbidding be-
havior and the sellers revenue using the timber sales auction data from the ODF. We
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develop an entry and bidding model with heterogeneous bidders within the APV frame-
work, and establish the existence and uniqueness of the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. We
adopt a structural approach to obtain the estimates for the structural parameters in the
biddersprivate values distribution. We are able to quantify the extent to which the po-
tential biddersprivate values and entry costs are a¢ liated, respectively, and nd that the
a¢ liation among biddersprivate information found in Chapter II is mainly driven by the
a¢ liation among bidders entry costs. We then use the structural estimates to conduct
counterfactual analysis to address the policy-related issues. In particular, we quantify how
the sellers revenue could change with the changes in the reserve price or the dependence
level. Moreover, we quantify the merger e¤ect and evaluate how it changes with the changes
in the reserve price or the dependence level.
Since we allow bidders to be heterogeneous and have a¢ liated private values, and
also take entry into account, our approach is general and closer to the real timber auction
environment. On the other hand, the analysis of the end auction outcomes and welfare
implications is complicated by the interactions of a¢ liation, asymmetry, and entry. The
structural approach we propose o¤ers a promising way to disentangle these e¤ects through
the counterfactual analysis in addressing policy-related issues such as the merger e¤ect.
67
Table 3. Summary Statistics of the Sample
Observation Mean Std. Dev.
Bid 245 376.6915 96.5321
# of Potential Bidders 81 4.2099 0.8619
# of Actual Bidders 81 3.0247 1.3036
Entry Proportion 81 .7251 .2852
Appraised Price 81 329.7940 95.5464
Distance 341 75.9155 45.3968
Volume 81 3644.333 3085.016
Duration 81 803.4355 212.5968
Grade 81 10.3236 .4570
DBH 81 16.7655 4.8213
Table 4. Estimation Results
Private Value distribution Entry Cost distribution
Coe¢ cient Std. Error Coe¢ cient Std. Error
Distance -.1414 .0098 1.3367 .0451
Volume .0582 .0026 .0688 .0011
Duration -.0785 .0071 .0296 .0004
Grade .9770 .0762 1.0687 .0223
DBH .1699 .0067 -.0770 .0011
Dependence .0983 .0045 0.5122 .0062
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Figure 4. Histograms of Original and Simulated Data
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APPENDIX A
Proof of Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
Bidding Equilibrium
The proof of Proposition adapts Lebrun (1999, 2006). We rst need the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 Consider a continuously di¤erentiable and strictly increasing bidding strategy.
Assume 
 10(u)
 100(u) is decreasing in u: If e >  and es 1i (b) and s 1i (b) for all i are two solutions
of the system of di¤erential equations (IV:3) with boundary condition (IV:6) over (e;e]
and (; ], respectively, then the inverse bidding functions satisfy the following condition:
es 1i (b) < s 1i (b) for all b in (max (; e) ; ]; where  > v:
Proof. Since we know that s 1i is strictly increasing over (; ]; we have es 1i () <
s 1i () = v: Dene g in [max (; e) ; ] as follows:
g = inf

b 2 [max (; e) ; ] es 1i  b0 < s 1i  b0 ; for all i and all b0 2 (b; ]	 :
We want to prove that g = max (; e) : According to the denition of g;  > g: Suppose
that g > max (; e) : By continuity, there exists i such that es 1i (g) = s 1i (g) : From the
denition of g; we also have es 1j (g)  s 1j (g) for all j:Moreover, there exists j 6= i such that
es 1j (g) < s 1j (g) ; because all the solutions coincide at the point g and therefore coincide
in (g; ] due to the fact that the right hand side of equation (IV:3) is locally Lipschitz at
b = g, which contradicts the fact that at point  es 1i () < s 1i () :
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From equation (IV:3), we know ds 1i (b) =db is a strictly decreasing function of
s 1j (b) ; for all j 6= i; since 
 10(u)
 100(u) is decreasing in u: Consequently, des 1i (g) =db > ds 1i (g) =db:
Therefore there exists  > 0 such that es 1i (b) > s 1i (b) ; for all b in (g; g + ) : This contra-
dicts the denition of g:
We then prove the rst part of the proposition by showing that there exist an ,
such that s 1i () = v:
Let i; 1  i  n denote bidders who have the highest bids, denoted by 0; at the
upper bound of private value v and j; 1  j  n denote bidders who has the second highest
bid, denoted by ; at the upper bound of private value v. So 0  :
For bidder i; we know that
 
v   0Pr  B i < 0jv  (v   ) Pr (B i < jv) :
It is obvious that Pr (B i < 0jv) = 1
Pr (B i < jv) = Pr (bj < ; bk < ; k 6= i; jjvi = v) = Pr (bk < ; k 6= i; jjvi = v) ;
since bj is not larger than :
Pr (B j < jv) = Pr (bi < ; bk < ; k 6= i; jjvj = v) :
Since the joint distribution of private values follows Archimedean copulas, we have
Pr (B i < jv) =  10
0@X
k 6=i;j

 
Fk
 
s 1k ()

+ 

Fj

s 1j ()

+  (Fi (v))
1A0 (Fi (v))
=  10
0@X
k 6=i;j

 
Fk
 
s 1k ()

+  (1) +  (1)
1A0 (1)
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and
Pr (B j < jv) =  10
0@X
k 6=i;j

 
Fk
 
s 1k ()

+  (Fj (v)) + 
 
Fi
 
s 1i ()
1A0 (Fj (v))
=  10
0@X
k 6=i;j

 
Fk
 
s 1k ()

+  (1) + 
 
Fi
 
s 1i ()
1A0 (1)
If Fi
 
s 1i ()

< 1; then 
 
Fi
 
s 1i ()

>  (1) and Pr (B i < jv) > Pr (B j < jv) since
0 (1) < 0 and  10 (x) is increasing in x. Therefore
 
v   0Pr  B j < 0jv > (v   ) Pr (B j < jv)
since Pr (B j < 0jv) = 1: But this is impossible because the optimal bid of bidder j at v
is ; therefore we have Fi
 
s 1i ()

= 1 and 0 = :
Uniqueness of Bidding Equilibrium
Suppose that there exist two equilibria and thus two di¤erent values  and e
such that the respective solutions s 1i (b) and es 1i (b) are also solutions of the system of
di¤erential equations for all i. Without loss of generality, we can assume that  < e:
The value of ln

Pr

vj < s
 1
j (bi) ; j 6= ijvi

at bi =  is strictly larger than the value of
ln

Pr

vj < es 1j (bi) ; j 6= ijvi at the same point. We have shown that es 1i (b) < s 1i (b)
for all b in (v; ]. When b converges to v; s 1i (v) = v:
On the other hand, the rst order condition can be written as follows
d ln

Pr

vj < s
 1
j (bi) ; j 6= ijvi

db
=
1
s 1i (bi)  bi
:
Thus
d ln(Pr(vj<s 1j (b);j 6=ijvi))
db <
d ln(Pr(vj<es 1j (b);j 6=ijvi))
db : Therefore, the di¤erence between
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these two logarithms increases as b decreases towards v:On the other hand, ln (Pr (vj < v; j 6= ijvi))
is a nite value since Fj (v) > 0: Therefore for two solutions, ln

Pr

vj < s
 1
j (bi) ; j 6= ijvi

cannot both converge to the same nite value as b decreases towards v: Therefore  and e
coincide and the equilibrium is unique.
Entry Equilibrium
The entry probability pi is determined by equation (IV:7) : Let p = (p1; : : : ; pn) 2
[0; 1]n and Gp = (G1 1 (p) ; : : : ; Gn n (p)) : Since si (v) and Gi is continuous, the pre-
entry expected prot i and Gi  i is continuous in p: So Gp : [0; 1]n ! [0; 1]n and
is continuous in p: A xed point of p follows Kakutanis xed point theorem (Kakutani
(1941)).
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APPENDIX B
Solving Equilibrium Bids and Entry Probabilities
Equilibrium Bids
Note that with the choice of Clayton copula, the rst order condition given in
equation (IV:3) can be written as follows,
(1 + q) (vi   b)
X
j 6=i
dF qj

s 1j (b)

db
=  q
 
nX
k=1
F qk
 
s 1k (b)
  n+ 1! :
Dene F qi
 
s 1i (b)

= li (b) ; then vi = F 1i

l
  1
q
i (b)

; and F.O.C. becomes
(1 + q)

F 1i

l
  1
q
i (b)

  b
X
j 6=i
l0j (b) =  q
 
nX
k=1
lk (b)  n+ 1
!
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Rewriting all terms in the equation as polynomials
li (b) =
1X
j=0
ai;j (b  b0)j ;
l0i (b) =
1X
j=0
(j + 1) ai;j+1 (b  b0)j ;
l
  1
q
i (b) =
1X
j=0
gi;j (b  b0)j ;
F 1i

l
  1
q
i (b)

=
1X
j=0
pi;j (b  b0)j ;
F 1i

l
  1
q
i (b)

  b =
1X
j=0
epi;j (b  b0)j ;
F 1i (x) =
1X
j=0
di;j (x  x0)j ;
x
  1
q
i =
1X
j=0
ci;j (x  x0)j ;
where epi;0 = pi;0   b0; epi;1 = pi;1   1; and epi;j = pi;j for j > 1:
Computation of pi;j ; gi;j: following the lemma in Appendix C in Marshall,
Meurer, Richard, and Stromquist (1994), we have
pi;J =
JX
r=1
di;ri;r;J   zJ ; pi;0 = F 1i

l
  1
q
i (b0)

(B.1a)
i;r;J =
J r+1X
s=1
gi;si;r 1;J s; i;0;0 = 1; (B.1b)
gi;J =
JX
r=1
ci;r'i;r;J ; (B.1c)
'i;r;J =
J r+1X
s=1
ai;s'i;r 1;J s; 'i;0;0 = 1: (B.1d)
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Computation of ai;j: from the F.O.C., we have
(1 + q)
0@ 1X
j=0
epi;j (b  b0)j
1AX
j 6=i
1X
s=0
(s+ 1) aj;s+1 (b  b0)s
=  q
 
nX
k=1
1X
s=0
ak;s (b  b0)s   n+ 1
!
(1 + q)
0@ 1X
j=0
epi;j (b  b0)j
1A 1X
s=0
(s+ 1)
0@X
j 6=i
aj;s+1
1A (b  b0)s
=  q
 1X
s=0
 
nX
k=1
ak;s
!
(b  b0)s   n+ 1
!
(1 + q)
1X
s=0
(s+ 1)
0@ sX
r=0
epi;sX
j 6=i
aj;s+1 r
1A (b  b0)s
=  q
 1X
s=0
 
nX
k=1
ak;s
!
(b  b0)s   n+ 1
!
Comparing the coe¢ cients of (b  b0)s we have
(1 + q) (s+ 1)
0@ sX
r=0
epi;sX
j 6=i
aj;s+1 r
1A =  q nX
k=1
ak;s
!
; for s > 0 (B.2a)
(1 + q) pi;0
X
j 6=i
aj;1 =  q
 
nX
k=1
ak;0   n+ 1
!
; for s = 0: (B.2b)
Algorithm:
1. di;j ; ci;j for j = 1; : : : ; J; can be computed by Taylor expansion. In practice, J = 3:
2. Decide ai;0; epi;0; i;0;0;and 'i;0;0 by the boundary conditions.
3. Calculate epi;1 from equations (B:1) given ai;0; epi;0; i;0;0;and 'i;0;0:
4. Calculate ai;1 from equations (B:2) given epi;1:
5. Repeat step 3 and 4 until ai;j ; j = 1; : : : ; J are calculated.
Now we have found the coe¢ cients of the Taylor expansion of the inverse bidding
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function up to the J-th order, so we are able to nd the equilibrium bid for a given private
value for bidder i through the obtained Taylor expansion at a appropriate point. One issue
regarding the algorithm is the boundary conditions. From the Proposition we know that
there are two boundary conditions associated with the equilibrium. Note that it cannot
be used here although the boundary condition at the lower bound of bids is known to us,
since it causes the problem of singularity. Therefore we have to use the condition at the
upper bound, which is unfortunately unknown to us. To address this problem we follow the
method described in Marshall, Meurer, Richard, and Stromquist (1994) and Gayle (2004)
to nd the common  rst. Roughly, it is to nd an  which generates the best equilibrium
bids at point v according to the algorithm described above.
Equilibrium Entry Probabilities
As is seen from the Proposition and equation (IV:7) the equilibrium entry proba-
bilities are determined by xed point problem. We solve it through iteration, described in
detail as follows,
1. Given an initial guess of poldi ; i = 1; : : : ; N; we calculate the probabilities of all possible
entry behavior occurring according to equation (IV:4) :
2. Given the calculated
R v
v i (vija i) dFi (vi) for all possible entry behavior in equation
(IV:2) and associated probabilities given in step 1, we calculate the post-entry ex-
pected prot i; i = 1; : : : ; N:
3. Calculate new entry probabilities according to pnewi = Gi (i) ; i = 1; : : : ; N:
4. If the di¤erence of pnewi and p
old
i is smaller than a given small positive number, ";
then pnewi ; i = 1; : : : ; N are the equilibrium entry probabilities and the iteration stops;
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otherwise, let poldi = p
new
i and go to step 1.
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